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The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) engaged in humanitarian work with 
Palestinians in Gaza as the newly formed United Nations took on a leading role in international 
humanitarian action. This M.A. thesis suggests that the AFSC’s unique aid relationships with 
Palestinian refugees in Gaza during the late 1940s was ahead of its time in identifying certain 
pitfalls at the core of the modern practice of humanitarianism. Rather than continuing to provide 
relief, the AFSC withdrew from Gaza and recognized that the UN-implemented structure of 
humanitarian aid in Gaza exacerbated the condition of Palestinian displacement and 
dispossession. Furthermore, they perceived that an unending cycle of humanitarian action was in 
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In 1947, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) received the Nobel Institute’s 
Peace Prize in recognition of “300 years of Quaker efforts to heal rifts and oppose war.” 
According to Chairman Jahn Gunnar of the Nobel Committee the AFSC received this illustrious 
award because of its unique, relational approach or in his words, their work “from the nameless 
to the nameless.”1 Chairman Jahn Gunnar further acknowledged that the AFSC’s distinction 
derived from its novel humanitarian practice, rather than strictly from its sheer work in the 
world. In his mind, the AFSC generated a much-needed reorientation of humanitarianism itself. 
Propped by U.S. Quaker group’s most recent initiative with Jewish refugees in and around Nazi 
Germany, “Governments and individuals knew they had no other aim than to aid,” Gunnar 
explained. AFSC humanitarianism was more than “giving people food and clothes.” For the U.S. 
Quaker group, at least as far the as Nobel Institute was concerned, it was “a question of restoring 
the integrity of the individual.”2  
The Nobel Peace Prize win solidified the AFSC’s global reputation in humanitarian 
circles for “honest reporting, economy in overhead costs, and absence of sectarian bias.”3 Lured 
by this reputation, the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) invited the AFSC, 
along with the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross 
Societies (LRCS), to provide humanitarian assistance to approximately 960,000 Palestinian 
 
1 The AFSC were recipients alongside their Quaker counterparts, the British Friends Service Council. 
American Friends Service Committee, “Nobel Peace Prize,” Accessed on 16 October 2019, 
https://www.afsc.org/nobel-peace-prize. 
2 Jahn Gunnar, “Chairman of the Nobel Committee and Director of the Bank at the Presentation of the 
Nobel Peace Award for 1947,” Accessed on 8 August 2020, https://www.afsc.org/resource/nobel-peace-
prize-speech-committee-chairman-gunnar-jahn. 
3 William H. Wriggins, Picking Up the Pieces from Portugal to Palestine: Quaker Refugee Relief in 
World War II, A Memoir (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2001), 33.  
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refugees forcibly displaced by the newly established state of Israel during the first Arab-Israeli 
war of 1947-49.4 All in all, the two-year AFSC initiative administered relief for over 200,000 
Palestinian Arab refugees confined to the Gaza Strip, a small Palestinian territory jammed 
between Egypt and Israel off the southeastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea.5  
The AFSC surprised many when it abandoned its mission in Gaza in 1950, despite 
distributing aid with better efficacy than other nonstate actors in the area. But even more 
shocking was its motivation. In the midst of an unresolved humanitarian crisis, the U.S. Quaker 
organization (praised for “having no other aim than aid”) abandoned its relief work with 
Palestinian refugees for “moral reasons.”6 When refugees needs were at their highest during the 
dead of winter January 1950, U.S. Quaker aid worker Paul Johnson wrote home: “We forcefully 
and vigorously feel that the AFSC must not renew its responsibility for the present type of 
operation.”7 The AFSC clearly wanted out of Palestinian Gaza, but why? 
This Master’s thesis assesses how relationships between members of the American 
Friends Service Committee and Palestinian refugees shaped humanitarianism in the Gaza Strip 
between 1948-1951. Specifically, it aims to unearth and explain the political and moral process 
 
4 Asaf Romirowsky and Alexander H. Joffe, Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine Refugee 
Relief (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 2. For more on the Red Cross’s efforts in the West Bank 
at this time, see Salman Abu Sitta and Terry Rempel, “The ICRC and the Detention of Palestinian 
Civilians in Israel's 1948 POW/Labor Camps” Journal of Palestine Studies 43, 4 (2014): 11-38. 
5 American Friends Service Committee, Search for Peace in the Middle East: A Report Prepared for the 
American Friends Service Committee (New York: Hill and Wang, 1971), 7.  
6 Nancy E. Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Dilemmas of NGO Humanitarian 
Activism (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2007), 96; Jahn Gunnar, “Chairman of the Nobel 
Committee and Director of the Bank at the Presentation of the Nobel Peace Award for 1947”; Ilana 
Feldman, Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2018), 100; Ilana Feldman, “The Quaker Way: Ethical Labor and 
Humanitarian Relief,” American Ethnologist 34, 4 (2007): 689-705; and Romirowsky, Religion, Politics 
and the Origin of Palestine Refugee Relief, 2-3 and 162-163. 
7 Memorandum, Paul Johnson to Foreign Service Executive Committee and Palestine Sub-Committee, 9 
February 1950; Archive Highlights: Palestinian Refugees in Gaza, Archives of the American Friends 
Service Committee, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania [Henceforth, AAFSC]. 
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that undergirded the U.S. Quaker organization’s decision to abandon its UN-sanctioned 
humanitarian mandate in 1950. In order to understand this decision and its implications, this 
thesis asks the following questions: In what way did these personal relationships with 
Palestinians shape the AFSC’s decision to depart from Gaza? And, more broadly, how did the 
U.S. Quaker’s distinctive approach to humanitarianism enable them to identify and escape what 
recent scholars have named the “humanitarian trap”?8 
The concept of a “humanitarian trap” represents the double-edged danger in which 
humanitarian actors can entrap themselves and the people they seek to aid in a perpetual state of 
dependence on foreign aid. David Rieff coined the term “humanitarian trap” in English in 
response to a dialogue started by French writer Jean-Christopher Rufins’s book of the same title, 
Le piège humanitaire. In the book, Rufins argues against the misappropriation of humanitarian 
aid or its use for political ends. Le piège humanitaire condemned the “myth of political 
impartiality” in humanitarian aid, especially when working with refugees.9 According to the 
French scholar, “the humanitarian trap” is sprung on displaced civilians who escape war only to 
become “trapped” by humanitarian aid. Aid then becomes a means to pacification for suffering 
people and a tool for external political forces to leverage for their own benefit. As Rieff suggests, 
supranational structures, such as the United Nations, can “use humanitarian action in ways in 
which it was never intended, most importantly as a substitute for Western political 
engagement.”10 In other words, a trap is placed when humanitarians preserve the appearance of 
 
8 According to David Rieff, the idea of a “humanitarian trap” was first introduced by French writer Jean-
Christopher Rufins in his book Le piège humanitaire : Quand l’humanitaire replace la guerre (Lattès : 
Paris, 1986). David Rieff, “The Humanitarian Trap,” World Policy Journal 12, 5 (1995): 1-11; and 
Romirowsky, Religion, Politics and the Origin of Palestine Refugee Relief, 4, 6, 162-3, 165, 167, and 
171. 
9 Rufins, Le piège humanitaire, 261, 317, and 336. 
10 Rieff, “The Humanitarian Trap,” 7. 
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caring for the victims without helping to solve the underlying problems and in doing so they end 
up contributing to an unending need for aid and other forms of humanitarian intervention. 
In its initiative in Gaza, the AFSC forecasted the formation of a humanitarian trap taking 
place and, in turn, sought to escape it. First, the AFSC refused to be involved in a long-term aid 
project with no humane resolution in sight. From their perspective, it became increasingly clear 
that the only practical solution to the Palestinian refugee crisis in Gaza were political solutions 
that seemingly flew in the face of the AFSC commitment to remain apolitical. As the refugee 
situation in Gaza quickly stagnated, AFSC members there believed that the stasis led to “moral 
degeneration” among themselves, as well as displaced Palestinians. Consequently, the AFSC 
sensed that their humanitarian role prolonged the situation in a way that contradicted Quaker 
ethics.11 
This thesis suggests that the AFSC, by way of its aid relationships with Palestinian 
refugees in Gaza during the late 1940s, was ahead of its time in identifying certain pitfalls at the 
core of the modern practice of humanitarianism. It recognized the inefficiency of the United 
Nations as a humanitarian actor both at that time and in that particular place, along with the fault 
lines of its overarching political role in global affairs.12 The AFSC’s early departure from Gaza 
showcased that U.S. Quakers were not seeking to expand or prolong their humanitarian mission 
for their own economic gains. Instead, the AFSC’s concern centred on the welfare of Palestinians 
 
11 Romirowsky, Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine Refugee Relief, 162-163.  
12 Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss, “Humanitarian and Practitioners: Social Science Matters,” in 
Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 264-285.  
 
Lisa Richey explains that traditional humanitarian organizations only survive long-term when they have 
abandoned their oppositional politics and instead engage within the supranational system like the United 
Nations. The result is that the larger political and economic structure that both funds humanitarianism and 
makes humanitarians necessarily are rarely brought into question. Lisa Richey, 2018, Conceptualizing 
“Everyday Humanitarianism”: Ethics, Affects, and Practices of Contemporary Global Helping, 2 and14. 
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over the long term. Rather than providing relief, they recognized that the UN-implemented 
structure of humanitarian aid in Gaza exacerbated the condition of Palestinian displacement and 
dispossession, as well as contributed to a growing international approach that prevented return 
against the overwhelming will of Palestinian refugees themselves. In other words, the AFSC 
concluded that the solution to the Palestinian refugee problem had to be political, not 
humanitarian. 
A key contribution of this thesis is its historicization of the “humanitarian trap.” It 
provides an important historical case study refuting Rieff’s claim that before the 1994 Rwandan 
crisis, “never before had mainline NGOs withdrawn not simply for reasons of safety, but rather 
in despair over the use their work was being put to and as a way of trying to draw a line between 
the compromises involved in any humanitarian operation and the morally compromising position 
that they felt they had been trapped in.”13 Almost half a century earlier, the AFSC departed Gaza 
for those same reasons. While in Gaza, the AFSC took a unique approach to humanitarianism 
that focused on grassroots relationships and the repatriation of displaced peoples. It was the 
AFSC’s relationship with “nameless” refugee peoples in Palestinian Gaza that moved the AFSC 
to abort its humanitarian commitment to Gazans for “moral reasons.”14  
This thesis contributes to challenging the historical misrepresentation of humanitarianism 
through the application of a conceptual framework that focuses on the relationships between 
people who give aid and those who receive aid. Its goal is to help expose the prevailing false 
 
13 Rieff, “The Humanitarian Trap,” 9. 
14 The term “nameless” refers back to its use in the AFSC Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech. American 
Friends Service Committee, “Nobel Peace Prize”; and Romirowsky, Religion, Politics, and the Origins of 
Palestine Refugee Relief, 2.  
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binary that separates the “humanitarian liberator” and the “helpless refugee.”15 This begins by 
demonstrating how Palestinian refugees in Gaza were not the “helpless,” or passive, actors that 
humanitarian narratives and photography commonly perpetuate.16 Instead, it shows how 
Palestinian refugees were active agents that shaped international dimensions of the Arab-Israeli 
and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. In the process, this thesis unearths an early historical situation 
whereby the morality of modern humanitarianism was simultaneously questioned by both the 
“recipients” and the “givers.” As a result, it will argue that the relationship between Palestinian 
refugees and U.S. Quakers in the Gaza Strip following the Nakba (Arabic for “catastrophe”) 
evidences a key historical shift in humanitarian thinking in the world.  
Through an analysis of how Palestinian refugees impacted a U.S. humanitarian 
organization’s work and self-perception, this thesis hopes to humanize both the humanitarians 
and the people they served. Regrettably people who receive humanitarian aid, past and present, 
are reduced to statistics and images in curated photographs, exacerbating their victimization, 
voice-lessness, and dehumanization.17 Attempting to both acknowledge and avoid this disturbing 
 
15 For more on how humanitarian intervention led refugees to be perceived as voiceless victims, see Liisa 
Milkki, “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization,” Cultural 
Anthropology 11, 3 (1996): 337-404; and David Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing 
International Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 91-93. 
 
The nature of historical study on humanitarianism tends to elevate the “giver” because records are mainly 
available in the archives of humanitarian organizations, thus representing their viewpoints. For such 
instances, see: James L. Barton’s The Story of Near East Relief: An Interpretation (New York: 
MacMillan, 1930); Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; and Wriggins, Picking up the 
Pieces from Portugal to Palestine. 
16 Maurice Jr. Labelle, “‘The American People Know So Little’: The Palestine Arab Refugee Office and 
the Challenges of Anti-Orientalism in the United States, 1955–1962," Mashriq & Mahjar Journal of 
Middle East and North African Migration Studies 5, 2 (2018): 91-93.  
17 For more on the history of moral justification for humanitarianism, see: Didier Fassin, Translated by 
Rachel Gomme. Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2012); Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue; and Randa Farah, “The Marginalization of Palestinian 
Refugees,” in Nicklaus Steiner et al., eds. Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees and Human 




tendency, this research focuses on the moments of contact between AFSC personnel and 
Palestinian refugees, along with their impacts on U.S. Quaker ideas about the politics of 
humanitarianism. In the process, it also utilizes Quakerism’s distinctive approach to 
humanitarianism to show how AFSC aid workers sought to listen to and raise the voices of the 
people they served.  
 
Context 
The insidious display of inhumanity during World War II, from the grotesque genocide of 
the Shoah (Hebrew word for “catastrophe”), concentration camps, civilian bombings and nuclear 
bombs, created a new international sentimentality for protecting civilians, the dispossessed, and 
overall human dignity.18 The Holocaust, in particular, discredited xenophobia and encouraged 
nation-states around the world to recognize the inherent moral value of human life. The 1948 UN 
Convention on the Presentation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide assigned all human 
lives equal value and mandated that each member of the United Nations commit to their 
protection. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that followed suit shortly 
thereafter claimed fundamental human rights to be universally protected for the first time.19  
 
 
For a current perspective on the shifting morality of humanitarianism, see: Lisa Richey, “Conceptualizing 
‘Everyday Humanitarianism’: Ethics, Affects, and Practices of Contemporary Global Helping,” New 
Political Science 40, 4 (2018): 625-639.  
18 Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present,” in Michael 
Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), 22-24. 
19 United Nations, “Convention on the Presentation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” Accessed 
22 November 2020. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml; and United 




As international consensus grew upon the notion that all human life’s had innate value, 
and human rights language began to consolidate itself in the late 1940s, the United Nations 
worked with Western non-state actors to undertake relief efforts in non-Western lands. UN 
General Assembly Resolution 212 part III, titled “Assistance to Palestine Refugees,” showcased 
its commitment to humanitarianism by stating that “the alleviation of conditions of starvation 
and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of 
the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land.”20 Consequently, in the former 
British mandate of Palestine, the United Nations established the non-operational agency of the 
United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugee (UNRPR) in November 1948 to recruit non-state 
organizations and coordinate aid distribution in areas where displaced Palestinians sought 
sanctuary during and after the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49.21  
For Palestinians, the Arabic term Nakba signifies the catastrophic displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who fled from their homes in fear of the acute danger of 
the first Arab-Israeli war and news of indiscriminate Israeli killing in Palestinian villages, like 
Deir Yassin in mid-April 1948.22 Displaced Palestinians left with the impression that they would 
be able to return to their homes and properties following the war’s end. The newly created state 
of Israel, however, steadfastly opposed Palestinian return. Permanent displacement and 
 
20United Nations General Assembly, “Assistance to Palestine Refugees: A/RES/ 212 (III),” Passed on 19 
November 1948, Accessed 24 December 2020: 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/EDC284B4A5508FD7852560E500670213. 
21 Ilana Feldman, Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 5-7. 
22 Ilana Feldman, Life Lived in Relief, 6; and Benny Morris, “The Historiography of Deir Yassin,” Journal 
of Israeli History 24, 1 (Spring 2005): 99. For more on the Deir Yassin and similar acts of ethnic 
cleansing in 1948-49, see Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine, 128-140. 
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dispossession of Indigenous Arabs from Palestine was inherent in Zionism’s settler colonial 
ideology.23  
During the latter half of 1948, international concern mounted over the emerging 
“Palestinian refugee problem.” Such apprehension translated into international pressure, as the 
number of refugees swelled and their situations turned increasingly dire. The "problem" soon 
rose to the forefront of all internationally led discussions regarding an armistice between Israel 
and its Arab neighbours. Arab governments endeavoured to make the repatriation of refugees a 
primary condition for peace negotiations with Israel. In 1949, the pressure resulted in a short-
lived, underwhelming, and ultimately retracted offer from Israel in which Tel Aviv agreed to the 
return of 100,000 of Palestinian refugees and their resettlement in a place of its choosing.24 Thus 
with reintegration off the table in Israel and adequate resettlement in other Arab states also being 
either denied or rejected, the plight of refugees exacerbated.   
Initiatives like the UNRPR in Palestinian lands, undertaken amid an emerging human 
rights revolution globally, resulted in a rapid increase in humanitarianism's prestige and power.25 
In an era of decolonization, a new global humanitarian practice took shape during the United 
Nation’s early years. This secularizing shift in the humanitarian imagination diverged from 
 
23 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 588. For more on Zionist settler colonialism, see Patrick Wolfe, Traces of 
History: Elementary Structures of Race (London: Verso, 2016). 
24 Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 599; and Nur Masalha, “‘Dis/Solving’ 
the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Israel ‘Resettlement’ Plans in the First Decade of the State (1948-
1958),” in Ilan Pappé and Jamil Hilal eds. Across the Wall: Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010), 107. For more on the 100,000 offer, see Varda Schiffer, “The 
1949 Israeli Offer to Repatriate 100,000 Palestine Refugees,” Middle East Focus 9, 2 (1986): 14-20.  
25 Peter Redfield and Erica Bornstein, “An Introduction to the Anthropology of Humanitarianism,” in 
Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield, eds. Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and 
Politics (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2010), 18-20; and Michael Barnett, Empire of 




overtly religious roots and centred instead on utopian principles of neutrality and what today 
would be labelled human rights.26 Humanitarian praxis was no longer predominantly rooted in 
religious goals, such as proselytizing, nor was it regularly undertaken by independently funded 
religious non-state actors. Instead, humanitarianism transformed into an UN-centered 
bureaucracy anchored in the collectively more palatable ideals of a secularized humanism.  
While postwar humanitarians reframed their work in human rights language, they failed 
to escape the fundamentally flawed paternalistic tendencies of their religious forebears. Although 
commonly citing a “shared humanity”—rather than God—to explain their engagement and care 
for refugees, they still mainly saw humanitarianism as something that was done for and to others, 
not done with them.27 An inherent contradiction in the legacy of humanitarian assistance 
continued to bifurcate “helpers” and “recipients.” In the words of Barbara Harrell-Bond, a social 
scientist who founded the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford university, this dualistic approach 
traps both groups into an “asymmetrical relationships in a structure in which accountability is 
skewed in the direction of the donors who pay for the assistance, rather than the refugees.”28 As 
such, the UN machinery perceived its sponsored assistance to Palestinian refugees as “charity,” 
rather than as a means of enabling so-called individual rights and resolving their collective 
 
26 Samuel Moyn argues, “[h]umanitarianism, with its origins in Christian pity and Enlightenment 
sympathy through its high era of imperialist entanglement in the ninetieth century, had developed in 
historical independence of rights talk.” Thus, despite the two terms “humanitarianism” and “human 
rights” having become amalgamated, this did not happen until decades later during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Immediately following World War II, humanitarian actors did not consider themselves 
as doing “human rights” work. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 220.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Barbara Harrell-Bond, “Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees Be Humane?” Human Rights Quarterly 
24, 1 (2002): 53 and 55.  
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plight. And as the Nakba unfolded, the basic needs of 960,000 Palestinian refugees necessitated 
the establishment of a “humanitarian apparatus.”29 
The AFSC, which sought to buck this trend, engaged in humanitarian work with 
Palestinians in Gaza when the United Nations took on the leading responsibility of confronting 
humanitarian crises worldwide. Quakerism moved the AFSC to engage with Palestinian refugees 
in a way that differed from the predominant humanitarian imagination embodied by many fellow 
religious groups.30 While most Christian denominations regard it as critical to imitate the life of 
Christ in the form of good works, General Conference Quakers differed from most other 
Christian denominations in doing this without proselytizing. This less prevalent Christian 
perspective and practice was a long-standing features of the Quakerism. Since the AFSC 
answered to the Friends General Conference, their values aligned with the broader Quaker 
community. Other key aspects were the Quakers’ commitment to egalitarianism, pacifism, 
humanitarianism, and peace-making. Following the principle that there is “that of God” in 
everyone, Quakers adopted a radical egalitarianism both in their processes and in their 
relationships with non-Quakers. This was also expressed in the work of AFSC. According to this 
 
29 Romirowsky, Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine Refugee Relief, 2; and Feldman, Life Lived 
in Relief, 5-7. 
30 For more on Quaker approaches to “the politics of help,” see: American Friends Service Committee, 
Steps to Peace: A Quaker View of U.S. Foreign Policy (Philadelphia: AFSC, 1951); Robert Byrd, Quaker 
Ways in Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960); Neave Brayshaw, The Quakers: 
Their Story and Message (York, England: William Sessions, 1969); and Howard Brinton, Friends for 
Three Hundred Years (Wallingford, PA.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1965).  
 
To consider the AFSC’s specific approach to humanitarianism, see: Guy Aiken, “Feeding Germany: 
American Quakers in the Weimar Republic,” Diplomatic History 43, 4 (2019): 597-617; American 
Friends Service Committee, A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1982); Larry Ingles, “‘Truly Radical, Non-Violent, Friendly Approaches’: Challenges to the 
American Friends Service Committee,” Quaker History 105, 1 (2016): 1-21; and Clarence Pickett, For 
More Than Bread: An Autobiographical Account of Twenty-Two Years’ Work with the American Friends 
Service Committee (Boston: Little, 1953).  
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principle, those they worked with were equally important to discerning what should be done. 
This made a deep interpersonal relationship with aid recipients an indispensable element of their 
relief work. 31 
Like other Protestant denominations and similarly enticed by Orientalist viewpoints, a 
desire to physically reconnect with the land of the Gospel spurred U.S. Quakers to be active in 
Palestine during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Eli and Sybil Jones, the aunt and uncle 
of AFSC’s founder Rufus Jones, opened their first of six Quaker-funded girl schools in Ramallah 
in 1869. Although spreading the faith through direct evangelism was not central to U.S. Quakers, 
their theology of individual action resulted in establishing institutions, such as the schools in 
Ottoman Palestine, that taught "Christian values.” As a result, Quaker schools faced controversy 
as locals waged accusations for alleged missionizing and Western imperialism.32 In 1924, 
Palestinian Muslim leaders called for the closure of the missionary schools. In response, U.S. 
Quakers consolidated their smaller rural schools into one larger-established school in Ramallah. 
In 1927, Palestinian nationalists demanded more control of the AFSC missionary school, leading 
Quakers to appoint the school’s first Palestinian principal Khalil Totah.33 Henceforth, the 
 
31 C. H. Mike Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation (London: Yale University Press, 
1978), 1 and 5; and Feldman, Life Lived in Relief, 99-100. 
 
‘The phrase “that of God in every man” has been widely used in the twentieth century as an expression 
which signifies the central truth of the Quaker message. Many present-day Quakers, when asked what the 
Quakers believe, are likely to reply: "They believe that there is that of God in every man.”’ For more 
context read: Lewis Benson, ‘“That of God in Every Man” -- What Did George Fox Mean by It?’,” 
Quaker Religious Thought 12, 2 (Spring 1970), retyped for electronic distribution by Simon Watson. 
Accessed 28 September 2021: http://www.qhpress.org/essays/togiem.html. 
 
32 Ela Greenberg, Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow: Education and Islam in Mandate Palestine 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 85-86. 
33 Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 24. 
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incorporation of Totah into Quaker leadership in Palestine engendered an important historical 
shift in the humanitarian relationship between Palestinians and U.S. Quakers.  
The AFSC officially began operations in the Gaza Strip in early 1949 under the auspices 
of the UNRPR. Despite being given the smallest UNRPR operation in Palestinian lands, the 
AFSC’s involvement in Gaza was its most significant humanitarian effort to date and marked the 
first time it relied on external funding.34 As the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49 scaled down, the 
Palestinian Gaza Strip became unofficially governed by neighbouring Egypt. The terms of the 
latter’s so-called administrative rule over the former territory were “profoundly unclear.” As the 
Nakba continued unabated even though a cessation of conflict between Israel and neighbouring 
Arab states was in negotiation, Gaza’s political status hung in the balance. Under UN Resolution 
181’s provisions of partition, the Palestinian territory was to be part of a newly-established 
“Arab” state—albeit in an arbitrary and non-Palestinian-governed way. The newly established 
state of Israel's military annexation of lands in the "Arab"-allocated areas of the former British 
mandate nullified the implementation of the United Nation’s partition plan. As such, the United 
States suggested that Israel take over Gaza to repatriate refugees. Meanwhile, Britain 
contemplated turning it into a base for its troops stationed in the neighboring Egyptian Suez 
Canal zone. Perhaps in response to such Western machinations, a contingent of Palestinians 
appealed to Egypt to annex the territory. In the end, Egypt insisted on governing Gaza as a 
distinctly Palestinian space without ever claiming formal sovereignty over the strip of territory.35 
Strict Egyptian oversight in Gaza was short-lived. Like the AFSC’s aid work there and 
the UNRPR more broadly, Egypt’s unilateral administration of the Gaza Strip ended in May 
 
34 Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 56. 
35 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008), 7-10. 
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1950. At that time, the newly created United Nations Relief and Works Administration 
(UNRWA) undertook an ambiguous co-supervision with Egypt in Gaza. Egypt refused to claim 
sovereignty over Gaza, instead seeing its administration only as a “placeholder” for a future 
Palestinian state. This fresh administrative arrangement left British officials to problematically 
identify the Gaza Strip as “res nullius, i.e. nobody’s property.”36  
As part of its responsibilities, UNRWA took over the emergency relief—that is, 
temporary relief—for Palestine refugees previously coordinated under the supports of the 
UNRPR and undertaken by the AFSC. UNRWA's establishment stemmed from the ideals 
outlined in the UN General Assembly's Resolution 194.37 Passed in December 1948, this 
resolution stated that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to 
property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the 
Governments or authorities responsible.”38 UNRWA, as a result, organized itself as a temporary 
agency to be operational for either a year or until a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem 
was found that safeguarded the right of return outlined in UN Resolution 194. Whereas Egyptian 
association with Gaza ended in 1967 following Israel’s formal occupation of the Palestinian 
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territory, UNRWA operations persist to this day and taunt the idealism of its early days that it 
would be a short-term solution. Palestinian refugees remain ensnared in statelessness; both they 
and UNRWA remain trapped in a state of humanitarian stagnation.  
 
Historiography 
Existing scholarship of the AFSC’s time in Gaza overlooks the role refugees played in 
the AFSC’s departure. Nancy Gallagher’s Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is a broad 
history anchored in the perspective of U.S. Quakers throughout the entirety of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. It provides a satisfactory chronological recounting of AFSC involvement 
with UNRPR and beyond. However, the voices of refugee peoples are sparsely present, except in 
quotes such as “the Gazans found AFSC volunteers to be, ‘a breath of fresh air.’”39 The 
perspectives of Palestinians offered in Gallagher’s work either simply reinforce the 
exceptionality of AFSC members or demonstrate Palestinian vulnerability. As a result, Gallagher 
unintentionally mispositions aid recipients as either helpless victims or props to elevate the 
AFSC’s actions.  
In contrast to the generous lens provided by Gallagher, Romirowsky and Joffe’s Religion, 
Politics, and the Origin of Palestine Refugee Relief is critical and at times even cynical of the 
U.S. Quaker approach in Gaza. It argues that AFSC workers were not strictly in Gaza to provide 
humanitarian aid; they also had a political agenda that tried to exercise its influence on issues 
such as pacifism and disarmament. Romirowsky and Joffe question the AFSC’s motivations in 
Gaza by contending that the United States asked the U.S. Quaker group to remain in Gaza for 
 
39 Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 94.  
16 
 
“[t]he interests of American Oil Companies.”40 Religion, Politics, and the Origin of Palestine 
Refugee Relief also claims that AFSC abandoned its religious roots to become radical and 
political in the late 1940s. Romirowsky and Joffe attribute “this new direction” primarily to a 
leading U.S. Quaker, Clarence Pickett.41  
Ilana Feldman, a professor of Anthropology and History, has written three books that 
intersect with the AFSC’s work in Gaza in the late 1940s. Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian 
Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics explores how humanitarianism affected and 
continues to affect the lives of Palestinian refugees, including those who reside outside of the 
Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Governing Gaza and Police Encounters: Security and Surveillance in 
Gaza Under Egyptian Rule both focus on the complex governmental structure overseeing the 
Gaza Strip between 1917 and 1967. Distinguishing characteristics of the three books are the 
inclusion of the ethnographic work Feldman conducted with Palestinian refugees. Unlike 




This thesis relies heavily on colonial archives since the transient impermanence of 
historical refugeedom often leaves little space for extensive record keeping. It follows the 
approach crafted in Keith Watenpaugh’s Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of 
Modern Humanitarianism. Watenpaugh’s critical approach aims to avoid “simply repackaging 
the history of a non-western people as part of a larger diplomatic or institutional history in which 
 
40 Letter, Arthur Ringland (Department of State Executive Director) to Clarence Pickett, 3 January 1951; 
Box (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project) Foreign Service 1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) 
series, AAFSC. 
41 Romirowsky, Religion, Politics and the Origin of Palestine Refugee Relief, 30-33. 
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Europeans are the principle actors.” As such, he addresses the challenge of writing cultural 
history with sources not written by that cultural group. Watenpaugh asks: “How can we use 
Western state, intergovernmental, and foundational archives to write about humanitarianism in a 
way that does more than repackage a kind of diplomatic or institutional history in which the 
history of non-Western people is retold from a Eurocentric perspective?”42  
Seeking to curtail a prevalent limitation in humanitarian scholarship, Watenpaugh 
employs a “framework of empathy” that actively looks for and listens to the “aid receiver” and 
interrogates the ways that archives construct their own narratives, along with the places allocated 
to humanitarian recipients. Such an approach allowed Watenpaugh to write a historical account 
of modern humanitarianism in the Middle East that critically utilized the materials available in 
colonial archives.43  
Like Watenpaugh, this thesis approaches documentation in a critically empathetic way. 
Alas, it also shares Watenpaugh's limited access to sources outside colonial archives. Palestinian 
perspectives are overwhelmingly filtered through Western archives, interviews, and research. 
Most source materials on Palestinians came from archives in North America and were written in 
English. The central locations were the AFSC’s archive in Philadelphia, Haverford Library’s 
special collection on Quaker materials, and the United Nations archives in New York City. These 
archives contain a diverse array of diplomatic letters, personal letters, journals, meeting minutes, 
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Chapter one examines a series of three questions. First, what motives did the United 
Nations have for inviting the American Friends Service Committee to distribute aid in the Gaza 
Strip? Second, why did the AFSC accept an invitation they knew would tax their resources? 
Lastly, why did individual AFSC members agree to volunteer for this mission, and what 
prompted their invitations? Exploring these critical questions will reveal both the organizations’ 
initial motives for taking on the aid project and what they deemed to be their highest priority 
objectives. Revealing that, while the United Nations and AFSC’s narratives often retroactively 
claim the only reason they went into Gaza was to aid and help the great human need, their 
archival records reveal a startlingly more complex narrative. This new account reflects how 
diplomatic motives blemished the humanitarian action in Gaza. Furthermore, the motivations 
that AFSC members revealed in their stories adds a layer of complexity and humanity. Despite 
leading with good intentions, the impact the humanitarians had was limited by various factors, 
including their own short-sightedness, lack of resources and training, and lastly oversite by the 
United Nations.  
Chapter two examines how Palestinians found themselves displaced to Gaza and the 
AFSC’s ensuing humanitarian project there, from its start on New Year’s Day 1949 to the 
Quaker’s official departure in the spring of April 1950.  It traces the supposed gradual “moral 
degeneration” of Palestinian living in Gaza area refugee camps. 44 Centring around the voices of 
Palestinian refugees when possible and the AFSC’s novel humanitarian practice, which focused 
on interpersonal relationships, the chapter shows how a unique environment was created within 
the refugee camps and amongst Indigenous Gazans. A channel was created through AFSC for 
 
44 Operational Report, AFSC, December 1949; file #67, Foreign Service 1949: Country-Palestine 
(Refugee Project) series, AAFSC, 4. 
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Palestinian refugees' concerns to be heard outside the Strip. While AFSC cultivated this 
atmosphere, their depictions of Gazans were not without problems. For example, staff were 
prone to using broad generalizations that invoked the racialization of “the Arab.” Generalizations 
about Palestinian refugees undermined the agency that refugees exhibited in shaping the aid they 
were receiving. Nonetheless, the problematic aspects of the U.S. Quakers’ relationship with 
Palestinians were in many ways quite progressive within their historical context. Ultimately 
these relationships still led to the AFSC’s withdrawal from Gaza, its organizational refusal to 
renew its contract with the United Nations, and a U.S. Quaker evasion of the humanitarian trap. 
Chapter three traces the process by which the Gaza Unit’s goal of repatriating Palestinian 
refugees to their homes was replaced with failed plans for resettlement and their so-called 
rehabilitation. It outlines how AFSC’s initial optimism that the United Nations would speedily 
resolve the “refugee problem” dissolved shortly after the transition from UNRPR to UNRWA. 
The U.S. Quakers’ reliance on satellite leadership from Philadelphia and their initial confidence 
in UNWRA fractured both internal AFSC relationships and external ones with Palestinian 
refugees. The fractures were exacerbated by paternalism under the AFSC’s new “rehabilitation” 
focus. These various challenges led U.S. Quakers to lose sight of the Palestinian refugee’s 
communicated desires and needs. Instead, they often found themselves operating as vessels for 
western imperialism until they ultimately departed from Gaza, never having made a major 






 Mixed Motives:  
The AFSC’s Humanitarian Approaches to the “Palestine Challenge” 
 
 Before the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49 and the Nakba, the city of Gaza served as a 
regional marketplace whose breadbasket overflowed with citrus, wheat, and barley.45 The 
majority of its Palestinian population worked in the nearby countryside. Many Gazan landowners 
and farmers owned or worked on citrus groves and pastures outside the area later known as the 
Gaza Strip. The Nakba drastically altered the area’s socio-economic life. Local residents in Gaza 
were swift and generous in responding to the fleeing needs of Palestinian refugees. They donated 
money, food, clothing, and other supplies. Indigenous Gazans opened up their homes, religious 
buildings, and public buildings for shelter. One local hospital was set aside exclusively for the 
use of the refugees.46   
In spite of such hospitality, local residents’ ability to aid refugees was woefully 
inadequate. The minimal short-term provisions withered as Gaza was essentially cut off from its 
historical economic network with the establishment of Israel. As a result, the local Gazan 
economy was ravaged. Within a few months, the small area of the Gaza Strip depended nearly 
entirely on imports.47 Simultaneously, the influx of Palestinian refugees, categorized largely as 
unskilled labourers, joined some 80,000 local residents. This created a surplus of “unskilled 
labour” and drove wages for the few available jobs down and below a livable salary. The effect 
was an economic disaster for the Palestinian populace, Indigenous residents and refugees alike.48 
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The escalating humanitarian crisis in Gaza gained global attention as the local Gazan 
people and regional Arab states were unable to sustain their relief efforts. As a result, the United 
Nations intervened and arranged an agreement with the American Friends Service Committee to 
commence their aid work in Gaza. The arrangement was supposed to be temporary, as both the 
United Nations and the AFSC believed that a political solution to the Palestinian “refugee 
problem” was imminent.49 
As the United Nations General Assembly determined the refugee crisis in Palestine an 
emergency, it called for “immediate and substantial assistance to the refugees on a completely 
non-political basis.”50 Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, pleaded for 
volunteer organizations to help in the Holy Land. Lie supported claims by the recently 
assassinated UN mediator Count Bernadotte, who elucidated that assisting these refugees 
represented “the choice between saving the lives of many thousands or permitting them to die. 
[Since] the situation of the majority of these hapless refugees [was] already tragic… [F]or the 
international community to accept its share of responsibility for the refugees of Palestine is one 
of the minimum conditions for the success of its efforts to bring peace to that land.” Bernadotte’s 
plea urged for aid as a type of reparation; a prerequisite to “bring peace to the land.”51 Yet 
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Bernadotte’s conclusion undermined Trygve Lie’s subsequent call for a “completely non-
political” humanitarian efforts because the assassinated UN mediator’s claims intertwined aid 
with political motives.  
The United Nations was not prepared to handle the large scale of this humanitarian 
operation. For the sake of practicality, it needed external help. Lie recognized this need and 
recommended that the United Nations not set up its own elaborate and expensive organization to 
handle relief assistance in the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. Instead, the 
Secretary-General sought out “non-political, non-governmental, volunteer organizations already 
experienced in field operations.”52 The United Nation’s intention was to create the “fastest least 
cumbersome least expensive and most efficient organization to rush aid to the Middle East.”53 
Administrative machinery was swiftly set into motion by the newly appointed director of 
UNRPR Stanton Griffis, who put Lie’s proposed plan in motion.   
Within a few days of his appointment, Griffis signed agreements with three non-state 
agencies, including the AFSC, to handle the upcoming relief projects' distribution and field 
operations for Palestinian refugees. However, only four months into the work, Griffis admitted in 
a press release how the UN-sanctioned “program is dependent on governmental donations… 
[which] have come in more slowly than expected.” As a result, UNRPR only provided the 
“minimum required to keep refugees alive.” It relied on the connections of the volunteer non-
state organizations to provide the items that the United Nations could not fund.54 Despite 
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recruiting volunteer organizations providing the “least expensive” means of distribution aid, the 
UNRPR program remained severely underfunded. While urgency and cost-effective solutions 
were significant motivators for the United Nations extending their invitations to non-government 
organizations like the AFSC, the United Nations held ulterior motives. 
 In Gaza, and by association the West Bank, the United Nations sought to bolster its 
reputation and maintain political influence. In official UN imaginations, the Holy Land was a 
strategic asset. In a personal memoir reflecting on the United Nations’ early work in Palestine, 
Trygve Lie discussed the complexities of the “Palestine Challenge.” Coloured with 
Eurocentrism, the UN secretary general blamed myriad complications for the trouble in the area. 
Issues such as religious tension and extreme nationalism mired the so-called Palestinian problem. 
According to Lie, these were “always strongest in young states.” Lie also invoked that it was a 
“conflict between the old feudalism of the East and twentieth-century social concepts,” the 
“human rights issues,” and lastly, Western interests in oil exploration and exploitation. Because 
the so-called Palestine challenge was so incredibly complex, political capital was to be won by 
whoever “solved it.” Trygve Lie, as such, chased such prestige for the United Nations. He 
coveted the area, explaining that “[i]f [we] wished to do something positive through the United 
Nations, here [in the Holy Land] was the place to do it.”55 
Despite being a young organization, the United Nations was already at the center of 
negotiations for various major crises across the globe. Having just risen from the ashes of the 
dissolved League of Nations and its mandate system, which in the case of Palestine had 
“disintegrated before the UN could make up its mind on how to replace it.”56 Consequently, the 
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infant United Nations faced the sudden collapse of British Palestine in 1948 and moved to 
aggressively target some internationally acceptable solution to the delicate Arab-Zionist conflict 
there.57 The United Nations General Assembly perceived a partition of the land as the best 
solution. It proposed a plan calling for the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states and the 
acceptance of international status for Jerusalem with free access for all races and religions. This 
United Nations plan, outlined in Resolution 181, was approved by a two-thirds vote of its 
members.58 The partition was not accepted by the local Palestinian Arabs, nor by any of the 
neighbouring Arab states.59  
As a result, Palestinian frustrations started to haunt the United Nations’ work and the 
perception of their intentions in the Holy Land and its environs around Gaza. Palestinians 
demonstrated an ever-present skepticism, stemming from the United Nations’ support of 
Resolution 181. The proposed partition plan left some to claim that Palestinian Arabs felt as 
though they were facing unjust disposition and paying for Europe’s war crimes committed 
against the Jews.60 The mounting Palestinian skepticism and disfavour meant that if the United 
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Nations wanted to continue exercising influence in the area, it would be to its benefit to operate 
in a more covert manner. UN officials conceived that supporting initiatives with goodwill 
reputations like humanitarianism would prove to be a good fit for the Palestinian situation.  
Thus, the United Nations pursued non-state actors for its aid project in Israel/Palestine 
capable of a large-scale humanitarian operation. In the process, it attempted to counteract its 
increasingly undesirable reputation with Palestinians and in the Arab Middle East more broadly. 
By inviting “non-political and non-governmental organizations” to reframe its humanitarian 
mandate, the United Nations sought to depoliticize and universalize the appeal of its initiative. 
The UN motivation to refocus the work on humanitarian efforts, instead of political ones, is 
transparent within the United Nations’ public call for assistance: “[t]his task is a humanitarian 
one—the saving of over half a million souls from exposure and starvation. It is not a political 
problem helpless people are starving and their race is the human race.”61 
In summary, the reasons that the United Nations extended the invitation to the American 
Friends Service Committee included practical motivations linked to the international 
organization’s limited budget and insufficient humanitarian infrastructure. The added complexity 
of an emergent Palestinian distrust towards the United Nations and questions regarding how a 
non-state actor could be trusted to take on humanitarian work without enacting the will of the 
(mostly Western) nation-states comprised the United Nations decision-making. The United 
Nations perceived the AFSC as a natural fit to help fulfill the international organization’s 
humanitarian mandate.  
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Why AFSC Accepted the Invitation 
Why did the AFSC so willingly accept the UN’s invitation? According to meeting 
minutes from late November 1948, the U.S. Quaker group worried that their involvement in the 
UN mission would strain AFSC resource capacity “to the utmost.” They also feared that the risk 
of failure would engender public consequences, as they would be in the “limelight” of the world. 
Even if they had some success, they “shall certainty not satisfy everyone.” Despite these 
trepidations, the pros outweighed the cons in U.S. Quaker deliberations. They believed rejecting 
the invite would be “a grave decision” to the detriment of themselves, as well as the United 
Nations because “[s]uccess in Palestine [was] a vital necessity for the power of the UN.” The 
Quakers believed that by succeeding in Gaza, the United Nations would garner praise and trust 
from the international community. This, in turn, would allow it to further intervene in world 
affairs in a “non-combative way” and make peace.62 This was a top priority in the eyes of the 
AFSC.  
U.S. Quakers felt that the “opportunity to demonstrate the power of the non-violent 
approach [was] enormous. [Trusting that] the political people have turned to [them] because they 
believe [the AFSC had] something more to offer than merely a politically neutral position.” Fifty 
years later, this same motivation for proving the efficacy of a non-violent approach was echoed 
in the words of AFSC and Gaza operation alum Alwin Holtz. In an oral history interview 
conducted by the AFSC, Holtz revealed: “[t]here was the worry that nobody had ever proven: 
 
62 Meeting Minutes, Foreign Service Executive Committee Meeting, 17 November 1948, submitted by 
Julia E. Branson, AAFSC. 
27 
 
Could pacifists go into a military zone and survive and do anything? And boy, oh, boy, we 
proved it [was effective].”63  
Two months after formally accepting the United Nations urgent plea for aid, the AFSC 
published another layered reason for agreeing to head to Gaza in the New York Herold Tribune. 
The article challenged the contemporary narrative, which retroactively claimed the only reason 
the AFSC went to Gaza was because of “the great human need.” According to U.S Quaker 
Elmore Jackson, who penned the Tribune piece, the AFSC did so “because it appeared that a 
framework had been found through which the combined resources of governments and voluntary 
groups could be quickly mobilized to meet th[e] need[s]” of Palestinian refugees. “As the 
program develops,” Jackson noted, “it will be illuminating to see whether this combined effort, 
which makes direct administrative use of international voluntary agencies in the distribution of 
public funds, constitutes to any degree a useful pattern for future international relief 
administration.”64 Heading into Gaza, the AFSC saw its aid work as an experiment on the 
effectiveness of depoliticizing United Nation funds by adding a filter in which external 
organizations with virtuous reputations managed the operational aspect of the international 
body’s humanitarian projects.  
Jackson’s Tribune article repeatedly separated the distinctly humanitarian role the AFSC 
saw itself playing in Gaza from that of the more politically driven managerial role of the United 
Nations. Since the United Nations was composed of nation-state governments, its actions 
represented “necessarily an amalgam of national policies.” Although the United Nations’ close 
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connection to its Western membership was a key component of its ability to raise lifesaving 
funds swiftly, the U.S. Quaker opined that it also raised concerns of conceivable imperial intent. 
Thus, in order to avoid enacting the political will of the “composed governments” that made up 
the United Nations, it was imperative for the AFSC and the integrity of its operation that it be 
given “complete independence.” According to the AFSC, its focus was “the simple task of 
preserving life.” The problems of finance, reintegration, and resettlement of Palestinian refugees, 
for their part, were left to “others.”65  
Jackson’s understanding of “complete independence” had already been secured prior to 
his article appearing in the New York Tribune. Terms around “complete independence” had been 
formally negotiated two months earlier in December of 1948 within an agreement between the 
United Nations and the AFSC. The agreement stated that the United Nations would give AFSC 
“complete independence, [and would] not in any way place it in a subordinate position with 
respect to the United Nations.”66  
Moreover, the AFSC sought to avoid enacting the will of the so-called proposed 
governments by adding to its terms that the AFSC would determine distribution based “on the 
basis of minimum essential need, without distinction to race, colour, creed or political belief so 
as to ensure that one group of refugees will not be favoured to the prejudice of any other 
group.”67 The U.S. Quakers wanted to establish clear control of their operation while working 
under the United Nations. They feared the United Nations might hold political motives and other 
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prejudices that could prove harmful to the work. AFSC director Pickett explained in The 
Philadelphia Inquirer that the “arrangement insures the impartial and non-political character of 
the relief service.”68 In short, the AFSC did not want the external international organization to 
determine where and how Palestinian aid would be distributed. It trusted in own process and did 
not want UN interference. Nevertheless, the United Nations’ categorization of Palestinian 
refugees determined who was eligible for assistance and who was not. These categories certainly 
impacted Quaker's distribution plans. The AFSC's desire to work independently was tested, 
especially regarding how to handle the increasingly dire circumstances of Indigenous Palestinian 
Gazans ineligible to receive UN-funded relief.  
The terms of the Agreement also signalled the AFSC’s earnest commitment to remain 
pacifist, noting that “[i]n the event of active hostilities extending to Egypt, then the American 
Friends Service Committee may withdraw from the refugee relief operation in combat areas.”69 
The United Nations agreed to recruit a devoted pacifist organization, even though their pacifism 
represented a hurdle that had previously led to the derailment of UN initiatives in the Holy Land. 
One year earlier in 1948, the United Nations had appointed Quaker Harold Evans to be the 
municipal commissioner of what they believed would soon be the internationalized city of 
Jerusalem. However, his pacifism was a reoccurring roadblock. Harold refused to accept the 
required military escort to Jerusalem as it did not align with his Quaker values. He would step 
down as the proposed commissioner shortly after his refusal to take up the role unless both sides 
upheld the tedious truce that was in place at the time.70  
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As noted earlier, the AFSC was highly motivated to show the world that non-violent 
intervention could help resolve complicated political matters. The Service Committee deemed 
the possibility of withdrawing from areas where active combat took place to be worth the risk to 
themselves. For the AFSC, the chance of succeeding in the “limelight” was enticing. Despite 
their members sharing concerns that Arab countries used refugees in Gaza as a “political 
football” or that “the plight of the refugees as human beings is not much of a factor [to others,]” 
the AFSC may have also perpetuated some of these offences in pursuit of success in this highly 
publicized endeavour.71 The idea that Palestinians had been wrongly used as a type of “political 
football” appears in multiple places in the AFSC historical records. Lamentably, this issue may 
have seeped into their motives too. While it may not have been their primary motivation, the 
AFSC also utilized Palestinians as a humanitarian means to political ends upon entering Gaza. 
 
Why Did Individual Members Agree to Join the Gaza Unit? 
Brooke Anderson, a non-Quaker member of the Gaza Unit (an AFSC term used stateside 
for the relief operation in Gaza), joined the operation for an array of personal reasons. First, 
Anderson was attracted to “the opportunity to participate with a team of likeminded individuals 
in trying to maintain a tenuous truce in one of the potentially explosive corners of the world.” 
Moreover, he reasoned that “it was an opportunity to do something for a great mass of suffering 
humanity, more especially the 70,000 Arab children.” Finally, Anderson committed himself to 
the AFSC aid operation in Gaza because it made a strong personal appeal to his newly minted 
pacifist principles. He explained that “[a]s a soldier in France… [he] had come to realize from 
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this experience that war, in [his] opinion, was the absolute denial of Christianity, and of all those 
ideals which we hold dear.” Disillusioned by his life experiences, he welcomed the opportunity 
to work on the Gaza Unit because it allowed him to be “serving as a witness to a more peaceful 
way of life and volunteered [his] services with those who believe and act on the belief that there 
is that of God in every man, the Quakers.”72  
Anderson’s collective motives were rooted in a deep-seated desire for peacemaking, a 
pursuit he was more and more convinced required a non-combative, pacifist approach, an 
approach that was a pivotal piece to U.S. Quaker relief efforts more broadly. Thus, not only was 
the AFSC chosen by the United Nations to enter Gaza because of its unique “Quaker Ethics,” 
many of the individual Service Members who chose to join the Gaza Unit were lured in by those 
same values.  
Howard Mckinney, a Quaker, applied to join the Gaza Unit because he felt like an 
outsider within the broader U.S. Quaker community. Despite having two young kids at home in 
the United States, he joined the AFSC in Gaza for six months because “[he] had never really 
been a part of the kind of thing” that Quakers had become known for doing. Explaining that 
Quakers were known for their service projects, McKinney admitted: “I had never really been a 
part.”73 The act of tangible service working alongside others was such a fundamental 
characteristic of living a Quaker life for McKinney. He felt he was missing something without a 
service project under his belt. 
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In contrast to McKinney’s motives, David Walker confessed that he was “frankly a lot 
more interested in the Service Committee than [he] was the Quakers.”74 He was interested in 
joining the Service Committee project, while also being apprehensive about working with 
Quakers. In his experience, the “Quakers were a little bit beyond [his] grasp.”75 Despite feeling 
some apprehension, Walker and his wife Della decided to join the Gaza project. Although 
receiving “virtually” no orientation for the trip beyond getting “lots of shots in the same day, and 
a tremendous reaction to the typhoid, tetanus, all in the same day” by “some Quaker doctor” 
likely did not ease his initial hesitation to work with Quakers.76  
While Quakerism did not initially enthrall Walker, he thought the value of the AFSC, an 
organization built upon Quaker values, was praiseworthy. The AFSC's distinctive 
humanitarianism encouraged Walker to join the Gaza Unit. In the end, he was profoundly 
impacted by the work and became a Quaker.77 Moreover, years later when asked what refugees 
thought of the Quakers, he answered: “I think they trusted us. I think they were puzzled by us[,] 
but I think they trusted us. I think being a Quaker has phenomenal advantages with people when 
they learn of us. Being a Quaker is Fabulous.”78 
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While not inaccurate, the pervasive internal narrative that AFSC members joined the 
Gaza Unit with the sole purpose of helping the “great human need” did not paint the whole 
picture. Some individual sought to fulfill a perceived rite of passage or duty of living a Quaker 
life. Others went merely because they were infatuated with the idea of having an adventure in a 
new, seemingly exotic place.  
Vreede Burher, another non-Quaker member of the Gaza unit, agreed to join the UN-
sanctioned humanitarian project because she “liked to work to help people. That was it,” she 
relayed in an oral history interview undertaken by the AFSC. “I wanted to help.”79 While her 
intentions initially seem entirely altruistic, not unlike the non-state actor she chose to join, it is 
revealed shortly thereafter that “[she] did it also for traveling and getting to know the country… 
You get to know much better the country, than when you go as a tourist.”80  
Not unlike Burher, part of the Russ Rosene’s interest in heading to Gaza stemmed from 
the chance to be working in an “interesting part of the world.” Upon receiving a telegram asking 
if he and his wife would “accept immediate service in Palestine,” Rosene reflected that their 
initial thoughts were “Very positive, very eager, very much involved.” Although “it was a 
difficult part of the world, [it was also an] interesting part of the world.” He wanted “to know 
how [they] could work in the situation and the only way to know is to go.” 81  
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A sense of adventure and discovery also motivated individual involvement in the AFSC 
aid work in Gaza. A desire to explore a “difficult part of the world” appeared primary to an 
imagined duty to alleviate the great human need. These reasons reinforced the problematic power 
imbalance that often-separated humanitarian’s givers from those who received aid around the 
halfway point of the twentieth century. Refugees sought to have their most basic needs met at 
times, literally being a matter of life and death. Meanwhile, humanitarians (albeit with seemingly 
noble motives) had the privilege of choosing to step out of their pleasant and secure lives in 
order to help other humans in need. All the while, they were simultaneously fulfilling their desire 
for an adventure in a foreign land.82  
The individuals that composed the AFSC’s Gaza Unit held divergent rationales. From the 
chance to aid fellow humans in need to the more innocuous adventure-seeking of which some 
were self-proclaimed “rebels looking for a cause,”83 the Gaza Unit was a bit of a motley crew. 
So, why was the AFSC offering positions to such a diverse range of people?  
 According to Paul Johnson, who was an AFSC member before heading to Gaza, the U.S. 
Quaker group selected an array of non-professionals amongst its professionals out of necessity. 
Essentially, they were running out of options. At least this rang true in his case, as he explained 
that “[a]ll of a sudden the Service Committee said, ‘Will you go to Gaza?’ I didn't know 
anything, I think, about Gaza except as a staff member. Not directly related to the program.” 
When asked directly in an oral interview why the AFSC chose him in particular, Johnson 
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candidly responded: “[w]ell, I think they were scraping the bottom of the barrel!”84 Another 
AFSC alumni confessed that when he was first asked to go to Gaza, he had no idea what and 
where the Palestinian land was. His first thought was that he had just been invited to go to a bar 
named “Gaza” for a drink.85 
While the AFSC may have been getting desperate to staff the large operation in Gaza that 
would tax its administration “to the utmost,” there were still some deal-breakers. Standards 
remained in place regarding who would be selected to work in Gaza. For example, Lee Dinsmore 
was scouted by an AFSC member visiting Cairo, where Dinsmore was working in a professional 
capacity for the YMCA. Dinsmore was recruited by the AFSC when they found out he could be 
an asset to their work, mainly since he spoke fluent Arabic. However, there was an apprehension 
to recruit him because of his religious affiliations and Baptist roots. A letter outlined this concern 
stating, “that because [he was] coming from the Y and because of [his] religious background, 
[he] might be feeling inclined to proselytize while [he] were there.” It was only after “somebody 
assured them that [he was not] the proselytizing type” that he was formally invited to join the 
Gaza Unit.86 In the eyes of the AFSC, evangelism would not be tolerated because it stood in 
contrast to their commitment to remain impartial and had the potential to undermine the trust 
they so desperately sought from Palestinians in Gaza. 
The trial to see if United Nations could improve their reputation, while depoliticizing 
their work through the American Friends Service Committee, began on 1 January 1949. While 
the AFSC had its own reason for agreeing to take on a humanitarian mission in Gaza, it also 
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sought to strengthen the United Nations' status, especially its potential power to solve political 
problems via non-violent means. While these aims were not always shared, or at least not the top 
priority for Gaza Unit members, they undeniably shaped their time in Gaza. Non-violence was 
especially central in the AFSC’S attempt to forge personal relationships with Palestinians, the 





“End Our Problems and Turn Us Back to Our Homes”87: 
Palestinian Refugees and the American Friends Service Committee’s Humanitarianism in 
Gaza Before the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
 
This chapter examines the AFSC’s humanitarian project in Gaza, from its start on New 
Year’s Day 1949 to its official end in the spring of April 1950. U.S. Quakers arrived in Gaza 
during the frigid and bitter winter of 1948-49. The situation for Palestinian refugees there was 
already critical. Some contended that their survival hinged on support from U.S. welfare 
organizations and international aid agencies, such as the AFSC.88 The weather was far from the 
only obstacle Indigenous Gazans, Palestinian refugees, and the AFSC’s original nine-person 
team faced. They also navigated life amidst the ongoing first Arab-Israeli war. As an AFSC 
member noted, the U.S. nonstate actor set foot in Gaza “when bombs were still dropping on the 
city.”89 
The Nakba that displaced Palestinians gradually took place both during and following the 
first Arab-Israeli war. The AFSC arrived in Gaza amidst the continued expulsion of Palestinians 
from their homes. This led to increasing numbers of refugees in the Gaza Strip and 
correspondingly an increased need for humanitarian action. The acute needs amongst Palestinian 
refugees intensified, as they believed their displacement would be short-lived when they left their 
 
87  Letter, written by a refugee boy in the fifth class of the Secondary School, 31 January 1950, Gaza, 
Palestine; file #268, Foreign Service 1950, Country—Palestine (Refugee Project) series, AAFSC.  
88 Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 142. 
89 Story by Brooke Anderson, sent by Field Director Paul Johnson to AFSC, 1 February 1950; file #268, 
Foreign Service 1950, Country—Palestine (Refugee Project) series, AAFSC, 4-5.  
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homes; most only prepared to be away for a few days. This was certainly the case when Um Jabr 
Wishah left her family home during the war in 1948. 
Um Jabr Wishah, a Palestinian refugee, recalled how a mukhtar (village head) refused to 
fly a white flag outside of their village, Bayt ‘Affa, during the British withdrawal from Palestine. 
Um Jabr Wishah explained, “our village Mukhtar refused because he considered that putting 
white flags above their village homes meant that we had surrendered our village.” Locals 
guarded Bayt ‘Affa. Nonetheless, war led her to flee south “twenty minutes by foot” to 
neighboring Karatiyya following an attack on her home village by Zionist forces that started at 
“one o’clock in the morning on the first day of Ramadan.”90  
In the wake of Egypt’s recapturing the village of Bayt ‘Affa in July 1948, Um Jabr 
Wishah explained that she and her husband refused to return home immediately. They 
recognized “that it was only a battle and still the war had not ended.” An intense fear remained 
that they faced death if their home was to be recaptured in future battles. Following reassurance 
from the Egyptian military that they needed to “wait seven days [as] the 1948 war would end,” 
after which they could return home, they stayed with relatives in Karatiyya. Instead of being a 
temporary layover, Wishah and her family’s journey to Karatiyya became the start of their 
perpetual displacement. Israel prevented Um Jabr Wishah’s return to Bayt ‘Affa after the first 
Arab-Israeli war. She later lamented that “if [she] had known that it would not happen and this 
would be the situation [still being displaced], [she] would never have left [her] home, even if 
[she] died there.”91  
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 The village of Karatiyya went on to be taken by Zionist forces later in 1948, despite 
being outside of the Israeli land allotment in accordance with the United Nation’s partition line 
of 1947. A November 1948 New York Times article, titled “Israel Balks at U.N. Order for No 
Man’s Land in Negeb [Negev],” outlined the United Nations’ recommendation that Zionist 
forces withdrawal from Karatiyya. Since it fell beyond Israel’s proposed boarders, the United 
Nations deemed it appropriate Zionist forces leave Karatiyya.92 That recommendation was never 
followed. Indigenous villagers of Karatiyya and Bayt ‘Affa never returned to their homes and 
both villages would go on to be occupied by Israeli forces and eventually demolished.93 
The first Arab-Israeli war continued in Gaza notwithstanding the AFSC’s humanitarian 
intervention in January 1949. Um Jabr Wishah’s odyssey exemplified many Palestinian 
experiences who found themselves displaced within refugee camps throughout Gaza and 
partially relieved by the arrival of AFSC humanitarianism. Um Jabr Wishah explained that the 
U.S. Quaker arrival prompted her family’s relocation from the repurposed prison of al-Kalabush 
into the small tents.94 Similarly, Abu Nadine, a Palestinian refugee from Yibna (a village that was 
the target of mortaring and firefight by Zionist forces during the war, where the aim was to 
“force the Arab inhabitants ‘to move’”) also recalled the AFSC’s arrival.95 Abu Nadine explained 
that, when their family first left their village, they experienced starvation and destitution. The 
family remained without supplies or really anything until U.S. Quakers arrived. Abu Nadine 
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reflected that “[a]fter four months, an agency came – the Quakers – and started to distribute 
flour, supplies, blankets and things like this…. They opened supply centers.”96  
The AFSC’s Gaza Unit was immediately struck by both the fallout of war and the 
conditions of the local populace. U.S. Quaker Elwood Geiger reflected upon the devastation of 
seeing so many displaced people when he arrived as part of the initial AFSC team of nine aid 
workers. Previous aid experience notwithstanding, Gaza’s conditions overwhelmed him. In 
Geiger’s opinion, there was no way “anyone can be prepared for 200,000 or more people without 
homes.” He could not “emphasize that enough.” Years later, Geiger admitted to his naivety of 
Arab culture upon arrival and his need at the time to understand “their side of the story.” He 
knew “a whole lot about what had happened to the Jews in Europe,” as he witnessed “the 
Warsaw ghetto when it still stank.” In his own words, “[he] had seen a pretty brutal picture and 
that’s the background of getting to Gaza.”97 
 
Early Days of Optimism 
Not long after the Gaza Unit commenced aid relief, the AFSC sent Board Member 
Howard Wriggins and Executive Director Clarence Pickett to observe and separately report on 
its largest humanitarian operation to date. Pickett lamented in his memoir that his trip to Gaza 
was spent chiefly among staff and public officials. While it was not lost on him that U.S. Quaker 
work was to be relational, Pickett admitted that he failed to uphold those Quaker ideals during 
his brief visit in January 1949. He was clear that when it came to the AFSC, however: the “larger 
the operation, the more we feel the necessity to give personal content to the work.” The AFSC 
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executive director realized that, in his own words: “the picture I give is one-sided, only scantily 
suggesting the arduous labor of the AFSC unit and the colorful personal contacts they had with 
the refugees themselves.”98 Pickett, to his credit, identified the limits of his assessment, but also 
acknowledged that AFSC work needed to be done in relationship and alongside Palestinian aid 
recipients.   
Wriggins’ report, meanwhile, focused on early concerns and tactics utilized by the U.S. 
Quakers in Gaza. The AFSC board member thought it important that the Gaza Unit reciprocated 
the warm hospitality he received, as it would build trust and connection with Palestinian 
refugees. Wriggins also joked that perhaps Indigenous Gazans were being too hospitable to 
refugees. He noted that, while “Arab Hospitality is proverbial… several tribes of nomadic 
[A]rabs who have been so generous to their guest[,] the refugees[,] that they have given away 
everything they have and killed virtually all their sheep.”99  
Both Pickett’s and Wriggins’ reports stressed that AFSC humanitarianism in Gaza adopt 
a relational approach. In response to such feedback, alongside “the incredible amount [sic] of 
hospitality which is showered on the gang,” the Gaza Unit set up a tearoom where “all team 
members [could] bring back anyone they want.”100 The tearoom was a practical action U.S. 
Quakers took to build relationships with the populace in Gaza. It also served as a reminder that 
the humanitarian actors were privileged to share tea and coffee with others in their tearoom, as it 
was considered a luxury in Gaza at that time. Abu Hassan, a Palestinian refugee from the village 
of Majdal (who went on to work as a teacher under the UNWRA’s successor program in Gaza) 
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reflected on how he was unable to buy tea and coffee during the AFSC’s time in Gaza, 
explaining that “[c]offee and tea were only drunk and offered to guest at the mukhtar’s place.”101 
Wriggins outlined key structural and mental elements required to frame the AFSC’s 
relational approach with Palestinian refugees in Gaza. In his opinion, the implementation of a 
straightforward method by which AFSC personnel heard and responded to refugees’ complaints 
was paramount. He believed that such mechanisms fostered interpersonal trust and ensured that 
the Gaza Unit was aware of issues as they arose. U.S. Quakers aimed to be the primary 
touchstone for Palestinian misgivings. Working with the Egyptian lieutenants that administered 
Gaza also mattered, due to existing circumstances. Wriggins noted, “[o]ur group felt very 
strongly that complaints should be handled by AFSC personnel” and not Egyptian military 
officers.102 The AFSC feared Egyptian military involvement could strain their humanitarian 
relationship with Palestinian refugees, resulting in missing important complaints and concerns. 
Emmett Gulley, the AFSC’s chief of mission in Gaza, echoed this sentiment. He determined that 
a relational approach that provided an avenue for Palestinian complaints served as a key element 
for AFSC humanitarianism. Gulley expounded that the process of hearing complaints “requires 
great patience and no end of time, but is a MUST.”103  
 According to Wriggins, the “ageold Quaker Problem, of getting across to a very different 
culture and a very different religious background” clouded the Gaza Unit during its onset. As the 
AFSC board member’s report emphasized, it was “particularly important that as soon as 
possible, as many [U.S. Quakers] as possible take every opportunity to learn about and penetrate 
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the Arab community and culture.” Historically, this was something “[they] find difficult enough 
even when dealing with French or Italian cultures.” Wriggins perceived a more significant 
cultural divide in Gaza than past aid projects. It was likely, in his view, that the Gaza Unit’s 
attempt at “penetrating the community and culture” may fall short given time and budget 
restraints. Nonetheless, it was imperative to run an effective aid program from the start. It served 
as the “very best indicator of [their] conception of equality and respect for all people.”104 
Toward the end of Pickett’s and Wriggins’ stay in Gaza, Gulley wrote a confidential 
report to AFSC headquarters in Philadelphia. Amongst Gulley’s topmost concerns was how to 
manage the “extremely difficult problem” of “hungry people other than refugees.” “Hunger,” 
shared the Gaza Unit’s chief of mission, “is becoming a major problem for everyone.” Despite 
being outside the UNRPR’s humanitarian mandate, Gulley relayed the increasing needs of local 
Indigenous Gazans who were going hungry. On a few occasions, the Gaza Unit fed locals 
initially denied distributions and relayed that “their appreciation knew no bounds.” Gulley then 
problematically deduced that Palestinian bedouins “are on the whole more highly disciplined and 
show greater character than the usual run of Arabs.”105 The goodwill garnered from feeding the 
bedouins was later noted in a March 1949 phone call: “[i]n any of [the bedouin’s] tents the 
Quakers worker is always welcome.”106 
U.S. Quaker involvement with local bedouins and Palestinian refugees shepherded the 
Gaza Unit’s reputation and opened dialogue between aid receivers and givers. Gulley’s unit was 
in ongoing talks with displaced Palestinians. The mayor of Gaza City, seconded by councilmen, 
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expressed “great satisfaction with our feeding program.” Importantly, they appreciated that 
“Quakers were willing to meet with people on a friendly basis and talk with them as equals.” 
Although he “had to speak [to the mayor] through an interpreter,” Gulley explained that "even 
the barrier of language did not prevent [their] communication of friendship.”107  
The Gaza Unit’s relational mindset with both Indigenous Gazans and Palestinian refugees 
paved the way for the AFSC to recognize crucial insight in the early days of its UN-sanctioned 
aid project. As the AFSC established its humanitarian presence, “many refugees [were] 
requesting the Quakers to do something regarding permission to return to their homes.” 
According to Gulley, and subsequent to the passage of United Nations Resolution 194, “[t]he 
most challenging question is the matter of repatriation.” Gulley correspondingly recognized 
“little or nothing regarding the problem [could] be done from Palestine.” Consequently, he 
trusted that the “Philadelphia office by every conceivable means, [would] work at [solving] that 
problem.”108 
As AFSC workers established their relational approach in Gaza, Palestinian refugees 
shared their moral frustrations over the Nakba. Of particular frustration was their inability to 
return home even as fighting slowed and political matters simmered after Egypt signed an 
armistice with Israel in February 1949.109 The new armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt 
outlined new provisional borders for Gaza. The reconfiguration of borders dispossessed 
Indigenous Gazans. Under the Egyptian-Israeli armistice, parcels of land in Gaza now fell on the 
other side of a new border and were deemed part of Israel. While local Gazans had not been 
displaced from their homes, many faced the loss of their livelihoods. Their exclusion from 
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humanitarian intervention exacerbated the loss as they fell outside of the purview of the UN’s 
definition of refugee. As a result, aid workers in Gaza were often tormented by the constraints on 
their ability to give aid.110 
The Gaza Unit’s relational approach to humanitarianism impacted both Palestinian 
refugees and AFSC members, albeit in differing ways. Palestinian resilience astonished U.S. 
Quakers. The Gaza Unit’s first field report, dated 1 May 1949, registered: “[o]ne of the most 
noteworthy things in connection with this project is the tremendous ability of the [Palestinian] 
people to endure hardship and face adverse conditions with a philosophical attitude and a 
minimum of real bitterness.”111 The auspicious tone in this assessment evidenced the Gaza Unit’s 
early idealization of Palestinian attitudes, which in the face of suffering were allegedly able to 
“endure.”112  
The AFSC’s early romanticization of Palestinian abilities to endure overlooked the lived 
experience of many who felt humiliated by relying upon charity. Da’ud Ahmed, a boy at the time 
of the Nakba, recalled the consternation he felt when he first received food aid. “Someone put a 
piece of cheese in my pocket and sweets in the other pocket… At the time, I felt myself as a 
strange beggar,” recalled Ahmed. “I was twelve years old[,] and I was crying…The people there 
brought food to us like beggars.”113 Another Palestinian refugee, Salim Rashid, lamented his new 
reality in Gaza. “From [Rashid’s] point of view… it was better if there was no agency [wikala]. 
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Prophet Mohammed said[,] ‘the high hand is better than the low hand.’ What does this mean? It 
means that the one who gives is better than the one who takes.”114  
Ahmad and Rashid’s words revealed a feeling of hierarchy that existed between those 
who gave aid and those who receive it in Gaza. They also exposed the complexity and stigma 
commonly associated with “dependency on food-aid.” As was the case in Amhad and Rashid’s 
memories, dependence on food aid interspersed with a sense of shame and defeat.115 Relying on 
external assistance, it is argued by researchers Paul Harvey and Jeremy Lind, has undermined 
fundamental refugee desires for independence and autonomy. In order to address these 
significant concerns, aid recipients often demanded a voice in the distribution of aid.116 When the 
input of aid recipients was historically ignored, it led to a refusal of rations as a form of 
resistance. In the case of UNRPR, this tactic was utilized by Palestinian refugees under the care 
of the Red Cross during a scandal reported in The New York Times. The concept of dependency 
is complicated further by the input of the aid agencies and their donors. 
Aid agencies like the United Nations and AFSC, as well as their nation-state donors, 
feared the creation of dependency on aid in the decade after World War II. Often, such fear 
justified the scaling-back of relief rations to the detriment of humanitarian recipients.117 The U.S. 
government disproportionately financed UNRPR aid for Palestinian refugees. Contemporary 
U.S. views on aid dependency influenced the situation in Gaza.118 In 1949, U.S. diplomat Hal 
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Lehrman publicly contemplated “dependency on aid” and whether the United States should 
further support UNRPR activities with Palestinians. He noted, “[t]he refugees obviously could 
not be left to die. But neither could the UN be again dunned for subscriptions to an eternal soup-
kitchen.” Lehrman dehumanized refugee camps, noting that funds should not be spent on “a rat-
hole.” Instead, U.S. aid should be spent on projects that would “finally dispose of Arab 
refugees.” In Lehrman’s opinion, “[U.S.] Congress could not be expected to underwrite a 
perpetual breadline.”119  
While less overt in their paternalistic propensities than Lehrman, U.S. Quakers internally 
discussed the drawbacks of aid dependency in Gaza. According to an AFSC member, it was “not 
uncommon to see [refugees] smile, or to participate in their lively banter” despite “’the Arab’ 
[having] been hurt and confused.”120 U.S. Quaker Donald Stevenson shared Lehrman’s 
perspective and problematic language during his visit with the Gaza Unit. In a letter to fellow 
Quakers, Stevenson opined that it was a “great tragedy” to have children in camps. Young 
Palestinians were growing up as “ignorant little animals.” In lieu of education at onsite colonial 
schools, they learned “to steal and engage in boy gang warfare.”121  
By May 1949, roughly four months after the Israeli-Egyptian armistice, Palestinian hope 
ran low. As a result, the Gaza Unit feared a revolt. The UN General Assembly’s “inactivity, 
[and] lack of work [for the refugees]” after Resolution 194, it explained, were “going to take 
their toll and bitterness will replace the hope [amongst refugees].” Those AFSC members close 
enough with Palestinian refugees recognized that many already lost faith in the UN-proclaimed 
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right of return. All that remained was a “solemn hope for [their] return to [their] home, if [in the 
words of a Palestinian refugee] ‘God wills it.’” According to the Gaza Unit, there were “no signs 
of [a] highly organized attempt to unite.” That said, simultaneous demonstrations took place at 
multiple distribution points. As they individually became more coordinated, Palestinian protests 
shared a standardized message and “demonstrate[d] to all the foreigners gathered at each 
distribution point their intense desire to return to their homes, ‘come what may.’”122  
Palestinian refugees in Gaza grew more “restless,” indeed. The Gaza Unit reported 
increased agitation as rations became “regularized”–that is, rations were being reduced. An 
ongoing reduction of rations stemmed from budgetary concerns and UNRPR miscalculations. 
The UN agency underestimated the number of people in need of food and did not consider the 
ethical obligation to care for the Indigenous Gazans also profoundly impacted by the Nakba. 
Only 650,000 of the 940,000 Palestinian refugees obtained UNRPR rations. The UNRPR defined 
bedouins as not being “true Refugees.”123  
The Gaza Unit quickly recognized the UNRPR’s blunder and sought to rectify it. The 
AFSC undertook “serious attempts to carry out a census.”124 At first, U.S. Quakers in Gaza tried 
to count each man and all members of his family. Palestinian refugees, when realizing that the 
amount of food they received depended on the number of children they had in their family, 
devised a clever plan to inflate their numbers. To help their families “grow,” the children, after 
being counted as members of one family, were routed around the building to become members of 
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another family. This realization prompted the AFSC to restart their census. The second time 
around, the Gaza Unit calculated “the refugees at night when everyone was asleep.”125 AFSC 
accuracy increased by placing “native workers in each distribution line” to audit the rolls and 
update information that affected the rolls, such as new births or deaths in the family.126 While 
their counting process was utilitarian, it still underscored how ration reduction compounded the 
impact of the already reduced caloric intake of Palestinian refugees.127 
 Im ‘Amir, a Palestinian refugee in Khan Yunis refugee camp, explained that despite 
being on UNRPR rations, her family “had no bread or food to cook. [Their] living was 
difficult… [They] were fighting over the distributions of supplies and every day or two people 
were injured… [While they] ate dried dates and guava, it was not enough.” Palestinian refugees 
like herself “started going to the forest and bringing wood to sell to bakers for a [small sum]. 
[They] sold wood in order to eat.”128 It was clear that being on the rations list was not an 
assurance that the humanitarian action was truly meeting basic needs of displaced Palestinians. 
 
AFSC Aspirations to Maintain Morale  
Initial U.S. Quaker optimism was short-lived. In a July 1949 report to the UNRPR, the 
Gaza Unit outlined its trepidation. The “morale” of displaced Palestinians worsened. Palestinian 
refugees in Gaza were “completely bewildered by the lack of any knowledge of what may 
happen to them in the future… it is probably true that some off[-]colour scheme such as 
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communism might find a response in such hopeless outlooks as are common in this area.” Not 
only had the boogeyman of communism seeped into the U.S. Quaker's minds amid an emerging 
global Cold War, it was also wielding influence and concocting fear in how the AFSC 
administered relief. The increasing unrest and angst of supposed communist influences 
concerned the Gaza Unit enough that it informed UNRPR of plans to implement activities aimed 
to “maintain a better morale among the refugees.”129  
The dropping morale of the Palestinian refugees, coupled with ongoing budgetary 
obstacles, generated friction between the AFSC, their workers, and the United Nations. There 
were indeed significant budgetary challenges. Some were more trivial, such as the “local mice 
whose biggest crime is not the amount [of rations] they consume but the damage they do to the 
[flour] sacks.”130 Others were egregious problems. A titanic scandal unfolded in June 1949. A 
New York Times investigation uncovered that, from the proposed $32,000,000 budget for the 
UNRPR,131 “more than $1,000,000 of United Nations relief funds [had] been wasted in excess 
profits for middlemen [over] the past four months… Contracts for the supply of food-stuff have 
been kept secret in the past[,] and the middlemen took advantage of the chance to sell low grade 
flour at 10 to 43 cents above market value.” The League of Red Cross Societies first brought the 
scandal to light by refusing to continue distributing the cheap food in the West Bank, demanding 
that all future supplies be bought through open bidding. The terms of the contract were then 
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made public. Palestinian refugees protested that the food was unfit to eat. Humanitarian inaction 
resulted in attacks on Red Cross distributors in some of the camps.132 Popular Palestinian refusal 
to eat rations and rejection of low-quality food were acts of resistance. 
This conflict between the Red Cross and Palestinian refugees in the West Bank alarmed 
the Gaza Unit. Due to limited funds, as U.S. Quaker Corinne Hardesty disclosed to the New York 
Times that the AFSC offered “only 1,500 calories a day for refugees in its area and [was] unable 
under the terms of the United Nations grant to do anything at all for the normal inhabitants of the 
area, who now are as destitute as the refugees and lack even the inadequate relief rations.”133 
While reform on the buying process ensued, this failure under the direct supervision of the 
United Nations exacerbated growing Palestinian scepticism and watered a mounting seed of 
distrust towards the international organization.134 
Apprehensions also arose with local Palestinian workers employed by the Gaza Unit. 
Palestinian workers were not paid by the United Nations, as outlined in the initial agreement 
between UNRPR and AFSC. The agreement required that the United Nations provide funds to 
the AFSC to cover local recruitment, employment, and other expenses. In turn, the AFSC 
supplied monthly operational reports and financial expenses incurred in the fulfilment of their 
agreement, certified by accredited auditors as required.135 The AFSC reported in September 1949 
that local Palestinian “guards still have not been paid.” Workers “threatened to resign; but when 
they learned they would lose all right for claiming back pay, they decided to stay.” The 
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warehouse manager in Rafah, Dick Smith, insisted that “[i]t is certainly important that an effort 
be made to secure their pay.”136  
Aside from feeling “plagued by the general UN fear of lack of money,”137 the AFSC’s 
distinctive relational approach to humanitarian relief with displaced Palestinians in Gaza 
safeguarded its UN-sanctioned mission. L. F. Skene, the warehouse manager in Gaza City, 
explained that Palestinian porters employed by U.S. Quakers received a fair wage. While paid 
less than those employed by the International Red Cross in the West Bank, they outworked the 
underpaid Palestinian porters employed by the Egyptian Army in the area. Skene noted that “in 
the long run[,] I think our portage is much cheaper, in that we do not have the thieving, and our 
men are willing to do any job.”138 The prioritization of advocating and recruiting local workers, 
instead of importing more people, was unique to the AFSC. Gaza Unit member Josina Vreede 
Burger “always appreciated very much” that U.S. Quakers gave more responsibility to “local 
helpers.”139  
Amid ongoing aid struggles in Gaza, Palestinian refugees continued to impress their 
desire to return home upon U.S. Quakers. AFSC workers, in response, deduced that the 
resolution of the Palestinian plight hinged on either an acceptance of repatriation (the return of 
refugees to their homes) or the much less desirable option of resettlement (immigrating refugees 
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elsewhere). Both options required a good deal of international intervention. However, the AFSC 
feared the “refugee problem” disappeared from the international agenda after Syria signed an 
armistice agreement with Israel in July 1949.140 The tenuously brokered peace arrangement 
contributed to the diversion of global attention elsewhere as the refugee problem “disappeared 
from the international agenda.”141 In correspondence with the AFSC in Philadelphia, the Gaza 
Unit sought to regain global attention and pled: “[w]e cannot too strongly emphasize the 
necessity of urging [the United Nations] to consider the refugee problem as the Number One 
item in their September meeting.”142 
 
A Growing Rebellious Spirit 
The downward trend in Palestinian morale proved unrelenting into the fall, as U.S. 
Quakers witnessed “a growing rebellious spirit among the younger people.” Two main factors 
compounded this spirit within the Gaza Strip. First, the AFSC’s “attempt to bring those refugees 
without adequate shelter into organized tent camps” engendered “a feeling of unrest.” Although 
many wanted a “new, waterproof tent for the winter months,” Palestinian refugees in Gaza 
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refused to move into “organized camps.” 143 In the wake of the Shoah, as Ilana Feldman explains, 
camps were often associated with the horrors of Nazi “concentration camps.” As a result, other 
humanitarian groups used the terms shelter and refugee centers instead of camps.144 Second, the 
UN-mandated mission continued to cut down Palestinian ration rolls. The Gaza Unit’s “vigorous 
cutting of lists, according to the request of UNRPR that the total registration be cut to 192,000[,] 
brought an element of further unrest into the area and caused a good many tensions.”145  
“[I]n spite of these potential sources of trouble” and humanitarian challenges 
notwithstanding, the AFSC perceived that its relationship with displaced Palestinians in Gaza 
“remained, on the whole, good.” “Maintenance of morale” activities offered both Palestinian 
refugees and U.S. Quakers temporary reprieve from UN politics and humanitarianism’s 
underbelly.146 The Gaza Unit organized various activities, such as woodwork, sewing groups, and 
sports programing. The AFSC provided transportation for Friday night soccer games, which 
sparked enthusiasm and drew in an estimated three thousand spectators on game nights.147 A 
Palestinian woman enthusiastically shared with an AFSC aid worker: “I live for Tuesday and the 
sewing class.”148  
During the summer of 1949, the AFSC observed that the morale of Palestinian refugees 
was “built chiefly on the hope that they will be allowed to return to their homes; they wait with 
impatience whenever news may come from the UN assembly. When they cease to be buoyed up 
by the hope of going back to the place from which they came, then their morale can be expected 
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to sag.”149 Thanks to its relational approach to its humanitarian relationship with displaced 
Palestinians, the Gaza Unit understood that their morale was intricately tied to the United 
Nations’ willingness and ability to solve the so-called refugee problem. 
In response to Palestinian and AFSC appeals, the United Nations surveyed the situation 
in Gaza. In November 1949, it acknowledged Palestinian calamity. Due to Gaza’s “limited area, 
the enforced idleness, and the continual presence of [Egyptian] troops [from] the military 
government,” the UN report concluded that “the area takes on the aspect of a prison camp. The 
only saving feature is the effective patience and kindly ministrations of the Quaker group who 
are in charge of ration distributions.”150 UN accolades for the Gaza Unit came with a plea. The 
international organization requested that the AFSC extend its agreed-upon fifteen-month 
presence in Gaza. Rumours of U.S. Quaker intentions to abandon their humanitarian mandate 
swirled. The newly-minted UNWRA program was far from ready to take reins. Lehrman noted 
the “Quakers were beginning to fidget over their unending chore.”151 The United Nation’s praised 
the AFSC because they subsequently feared an early departure by U.S. Quaker’s would result in 
a lack of humanitarian intervention in Gaza leading to local unrest.  
During the fall, the Gaza Unit sent a telling letter to AFSC Director Pickett.  It explained 
how aid workers felt “an obligation” to communicate the opinions and feelings of Palestinian 
refugees because it was “very difficult” for the latter to “communicate with the outside world.” 
Two sentiments prevailed that were crucial to Palestinian dispossessed in Gaza. First, many 
Palestinian refugees felt the United Nations was “responsible for their plight.” As such, 
Palestinians felt that it was the obligation of the international organization to take care of their 
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needs. Second, a popular feeling persisted that “the matter could be finished by war.” The Gaza 
Unit quoted Palestinian refugees in Gaza as pleading: “Why don’t you leave us.”152 Abu Ayub, a 
refugee living in Shati camp, deplored: “[t]hey brought us food, blankets some cheese, and dry 
dates and everything. There was more food than you can imagine. But what is the benefit?”153 
Following further discussions, the AFSC concluded that Palestinian refugees overwhelmingly 
wanted it to leave Gaza. Consequently, U.S. Quakers internally warned the AFSC to not renew 
its aid agreement with the United Nations.  
 
Morale v. Morals  
As the end of UN-mandated humanitarian mission neared its official conclusion in 
December 1949, the Gaza Unit relayed the ongoing “morale degradation” of dispossessed 
Palestinians. “As the refugees in the Gaza Strip entered a second winter of miserable living 
conditions with no relief insight,” aid workers explained to AFSC headquarters: “the 
deterioration of morale, evidenced by an increased feeling of discouragement and 
disillusionment, has continued. The almost universal attitude now is that any change is preferable 
to what they are now enduring.” The weather did not help when a torrential downpour destroyed 
tents throughout camps: “tents thought to be waterproof turned out to be no better than sieves.” 
What is more, Palestinian refugees received approximately sixteen hundred calories of food aid 
per day—that is, four hundred calories below the rations reported at the start of 1949.154  
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While the reduction of calories was clearly more deleterious and encompassing for 
Palestinian aid receivers, it had a psychological impact on U.S. Quaker aid givers that drove a 
divide between the two groups. Gaza Unit member Brooke Anderson wrestled with the cut 
rations and feeling of guilt about receiving more than enough calories to fill his needs. Anderson 
shared the uncomfortable position he and others found themselves in while trying to navigate 
their humanitarian work in Gaza: 
I had a friend of a friend in Beirut, a doctor, who had the reputation of having personally 
kept alive 1000 people during the war. Yet he said to me one occasion, ‘Anderson, I have 
seen women with children on their breasts starving in the street outside of my house, yet I 
have gone in and eat a hearty dinner.’ I wondered what I would do under similar 
circumstances. I know the answer now. I eat from 3200 to 3600 calories daily. I think that 
there is a psychological twist to it which makes me feel that I want more to eat not less, 
although I know that I am surrounded by more hungry people than there are citizens, let's 
say, in the city of Richmond [approx. 250,000]. This question has dogged and deviled the 
conscience of many in this team before I joined it. It seems to be one of those things 
which each has to deal with personally, and leave him wondering whether if he satisfied 
his appetite will he lose his conscience.155 
 
 
The “dogged and deviled conscience” Anderson described revealed how aid workers 
experienced a type of “morale degeneration” in a relational way in Gaza. While AFSC aid 
workers confronted a deep discomfort, it came at the expense of the suffering of displaced 
Palestinians. 
The AFSC’s humanitarian mindset made it clear that, by the end of 1949, the situation of 
Palestinian refugees stagnated. The Gaza Unit, as a result, underwent a shift not only in morale 
but also morals.156 U.S. Quakers sensed that their humanitarian role prolonged the Nakba in a 
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way that contradicted “Quaker ethics.”157 It particularly affected the ethic that their aid work was 
meant to uphold the dignity of people. This changing reality upended the AFSC’s “shared ethical 
practice” with recipients of humanitarianism.158 
An ongoing illustration that gnashed and pulled against U.S. Quaker ethics were the 
continued orders from the United Nations to reduce ration rolls. This ongoing requirement 
conflicted with the Gaza Unit’s relational approach and created unwanted fractures with 
Palestinian refugees. The United Nations forced the AFSC into “using food as a weapon” in 
Gaza. The international organization obliged the Gaza Unit to remove women from the roll who 
married non-dispossessed Palestinians and rewarded muktars who reported falsified rolls to 
decrease rations from 245,000 to about 211,000. 159 Such imposed tactics proved unacceptable to 
 
connection between “bad habits” and impoverished living conditions. Hanan additionally reflected that 
the humanitarian action in their lands undergirded a class struggle or “class rancor” (haqd al-tabaqi) 
between Indigenous Gazans and the displaced Palestinians harboring in Gaza. See: “Al-Ahram, 18 August 
1951” and “Interview with Hanan, Gaza City, 19 April 1999,” in Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza, 128-
130.  
157 Romirowsky, Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine Refugee Relief, 163.  
158 Feldman, Life Lived in Relief, 101. 
159 Report, Measures Employed by the American Friends Service Committee to Reduce the Number of 
Rations Issued in the Gaza Strip, December 1949; file # 83 Foreign Service 1949, Country-Palestine 
(Refugee Project) series, AAFSC.  
 
For more on the ways in which Quaker ethics were challenged during their time in Gaza see Ilana 
Feldman’s article, “The Quaker Way: Ethical Labor and Humanitarian Relief,” American Ethnologist 34, 
4 (2007): 689-705. 
 
The practice of weaponizing food is a way that humanitarian action can become an avenue for imperial 
powers to retain influence in foreign lands. A particularly ironic example of weaponizing food as a means 
of foreign policy is from 1973 was when the United States literally gave Israel weapons and gave 
Egyptian’s food. At the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, American President Nixon told his staff, “[w]e 
must maintain the balance. Weapons for Israel and P[ublic] Law 480 [also known as Food for Peace] for 
Egypt.” See: Memorandum of Conversation, 31 May 1974; FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Arab-Israeli 
Dispute, 1974–1976, Doc. 91. 
 
For a history of food being utilized as a tool of American foreign policy, read: Barry Riley, The Political 
History of American Food Aid: An Uneasy Benevolence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
59 
 
U.S. Quakers in Gaza. The latter, a result, identified that UN involvement structurally countered 
the AFSC’s desired relational approach with Palestinians refugees.  
 As menacing weather, social tensions, and lowering rations disturbed collective morale in 
Gaza, U.S. Quakers maintained a dialogue with dispossessed Palestinians. By 1949’s end, the 
Gaza Unit firmly believed most refugees maintained “strong hopes that a political settlement will 
allow them to return to their homes.” Some, especially amongst the older population, desired “no 
more than compensation for what they have lost.” Others wanted a “plan—any plan—which will 
give them a feeling of permanency and a sense of security.”160 The displacement, impermanency, 
and insecurity of living life as a refugee downgraded Palestinian hope. This change was not lost 
on AFSC workers. While somewhat hand-tied in the field, they continued to implore the United 
Nations and their home offices to work towards a meaningful political solution to the ongoing 
crisis. 
 The lasting Nakba directly found its way to the U.S. Quaker headquarters when AFSC 
worker Jean Johnson passed along a full one-page letter penned by an unnamed Palestinian boy 
that she tutored in English twice per week. According to Johnson, the letter “expresses the 
refugees’ situation so much better than [her] words can.” The Gaza Unit member “knew, of 
course, that many refugees are far worse off – but they are the ones who cannot speak for 
themselves as this [B]oy can.”161  
The Palestinian boy’s letter outlined “this bad life which every refugee live” in Gaza. He 
offered a rare glimpse in English of “how the refugees live.” His immediate family, totaling 
fifteen, lived in three small tents. They were fortunate, even though they had five persons per 
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tent. “[M]any strangers are living in one tent,” which was “not good.” Furthermore, “[s]ome of 
the tents are new and most of them are old,” he explained. Many often did not withstand the rain 
and barely shielded sandstorms. To make matters worse, there were not enough tents for 
everyone. The same applied for “good clothes to wear or to cover with save some blankets which 
are from Quakers.” He relayed that nearly all Palestinian refugees in Gaza were “without shoes” 
and “other necessary things.”162 
UN food rations affected his family deeply. According to the Palestinian boy, his family 
received “ten kelos of flour and other things monthly. This sum of flour,” he contended, “was not 
enough to satisfy every one save the children.” Refugee families were thus “obliged to buy other 
some of flour beside the first sum.” His family, like most, had no money. Others “dared to go to 
their villages” to find items to sell; “Sometimes [they] might die.” The Palestinian boy did not 
even have a “a table to read on or a chair to sit on” in his family’s tent. He “had no bed to sleep 
on.” In the end, all he wanted was for “God to end our problems and turn us back to our homes 
to live a good and quiet life.”163 
Eventually, an overwhelming panoply of Palestinian pleas led U.S. Quakers to identify a 
humanitarian trap in Gaza and attempt to escape it. In early 1950, the Gaza Unit’s voiced 
stateside that it had “complete unanimity”: it “forcefully and vigorously fe[lt] that the AFSC 
must not renew its responsibility for the present type of operation.” U.S. Quaker aid workers 
believed that “[b]y putting our foot down [,] we can bring pressure on the U.N. to get busy and 
go to work on its responsibilities.”164 The AFSC believed that such responsibilities included 
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wielding its global influence to find a political solution to the so-called refugee problem. Since 
the AFSC believed itself to be apolitical, the U.S. nonstate actor wanted the United Nations to 
formally take over—albeit while still employing former members of the Gaza Unit. In talking 
with aid recipients, U.S. Quakers believed that an AFSC departure obliged the United Nations to 
solve its Palestinian refugee problem.  
 The Gaza Unit, as a result, adamantly refused to renew their contract with the United 
Nations past the previously established end date of 31 March 1950. It collectively outlined four 
factors contributing to this imploration. Firstly, they believed that the Gaza program continued to 
become less and less an AFSC program. Secondly, they feared that failure to name a specific 
date of withdrawal would leave them “trapped” in a humanitarian trap where “the postponements 
may have no end.” Thirdly, and most ominously, “[they] do not want to be there when the blow-
up occurs.” Lastly, they felt that refusal to renew their work pushed the United Nations to have 
more extensive involvement that may lead to promising political solutions that remained 
unfeasible as long as the AFSC undertook humanitarian work in Gaza. In the end, “The worst 
weather in fifty years” upended the AFSC’s March departure from Gaza, resulting in a one-
month extension of its UN-sanctioned mission. After formally agreeing to stay through April, the 
AFSC found it “quite clear that the Gaza staff is at present laboring through a very difficult 
situation, and that the refugees themselves are in an impossible position. It points up again 
clearly that the only solution for the Gaza refugees is their movement out of this Strip and 
settlement elsewhere.”165  
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The AFSC’s novel approach to humanitarianism facilitated its identification of a 
“humanitarian trap” at work in Gaza during and immediately after the first Arab-Israeli war. 
Their divergent approach centred upon the Quakers’ firm belief that a deep interpersonal 
relationship with aid recipients was an indispensable element of relief work.166 Listening to 
Palestinian refugees ultimately led to the U.S. Quaker refusal to be involved in a long-term aid 
project with no humane resolution in sight. From the AFSC’s perspective, it became increasingly 
clear throughout their time in Gaza that the only practical solutions to the Palestinian refugee 
crisis in Gaza and beyond were political ones; political solutions that seemingly flew in the face 
of the AFSC’s commitment to remain apolitical in their humanitarian pursuits.  
  
 




Humanitarians Entrapped:  
 
When A "Heart for People in Trouble"167 Is Not Enough 
 
 
The AFSC’s official aid mandate in Gaza ended on 1 May 1950. As UNWRA took over, 
AFSC members no longer saw themselves as humanitarians who delivered emergency aid. 
Instead, most U.S. Quakers who remained in Gaza saw themselves in new roles focused on 
training refugees and shepherding impending resettlements.168 The AFSC, at that time, was under 
the illusion that UNWRA would maintain a relational approach to humanitarian relief with 
Palestinians after its departure. The United Nations, they also thought, would quickly remedy the 
Palestinian refugee crisis, effectively evading the formation of a “humanitarian trap.” Both 
beliefs proved false. Upon identifying UN failures, former Gaza Unit members maintained that 
the AFSC had an “ethical obligation” to help Palestinian refugees resettle. However, Quaker 
ethics stood at odds with AFSC humanitarian work in Gaza. U.S. Quakers believed that the “UN 
should assume responsibility” of administering continued relief. 169 By 1951, such tensions led 
the AFSC to lose faith in UNWRA and reject working with or under UNWRA to resettle 
Palestinian refugees in Gaza and elsewhere.170 
Upon handing over their humanitarian responsibilities to UNWRA, the AFSC shared the 
United Nation’s paternalist assumption that repatriation or reintegration hinged upon education 
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and training, or the so-called “social rehabilitation of the refugees.”171 The creation of UNWRA 
represented a flawed UN attempt to resolve the Palestinian refugee crisis and elude long-term 
humanitarian involvement in Gaza by seeking to pass humanitarian responsibility off to regional 
Arab governments.172 UNWRA was meant to be short-term and impermanent at its creation. 
From the perspectives of the U.S. Quaker group and the United Nations, UNWRA would only be 
temporarily operational, pending repatriation into Israel or reintegration of refugee camps into 
non-Palestinian Arab host countries. The AFSC naively assumed that UNWRA would provide 
the “adequate steps for the resettlement or repatriation of refugees soon.”173 In the end, the AFSC 
withdrew from Gaza without alleviating the necessity of foreign aid or overseeing large scale 
resettlements. Meanwhile, UNWRA’s short-term mandate was cemented into a “humanitarian 
trap,” entrapping both humanitarians and Palestinian refugees in an endless cycle of 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
Shifting Motives: How “Rehabilitation of Refugees” Moved to the Forefront  
As the Gaza Unit’s UN-sanctioned humanitarian project ended, AFSC leadership in 
Philadelphia shifted its focus toward resolving the so-called Palestinian refugee problem and 
stifling the developing “humanitarian trap” for aid givers and receives alike. In its final three 
months in the Gaza Strip, the U.S. Quaker group employed “maximum influence toward a 
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permanent solution of the refugee problem.” AFSC headquarters in Philadelphia tasked its 
members in Gaza to hold “a series of quiet talks” with Egyptian and Israeli representatives, 
which purposefully excluded Palestinians, to find a “genuine solution.” In another turn of AFSC 
field operations, it also encouraged the Gaza Unit to find personnel who could gain Israel’s 
confidence to make possible the “resettlement and integrating of Arabs into Israeli life.”174  
As the AFSC leadership outside of Gaza took a political turn toward the so-called 
Palestinian refugee problem, U.S. Quakers in Gaza adopted a paternalistic approach to their 
humanitarian efforts that differed significantly from its previous relational focus. AFSC 
humanitarians prioritized the “rehabilitation” of Palestinian refugees over working alongside 
Palestinian refugees to deliver aid equitably. The notion of rehabilitating refugees was inherently 
paternalistic, positioning humanitarians as teachers who taught prescribed skills to Palestinian 
refugees that were deemed necessary for successful resettlement or reintegration. The concept of 
Palestinian rehabilitation also invoked problematic assumptions that Palestinian refugees needed 
to be taught. That is, the AFSC accepted the idea that the Palestinian refugee problem was a now 
more of a human problem, rather than a political one. In other words, this new approach placed 
more culpability on Palestinians than on the political situation that engendered Palestinian 
displacement and exile. The implication being that Palestinian refugees could be trained or 
educated out of poverty and humanitarian intervention would no longer be required. As a result, 
the U.S. non-state actor called upon its aid workers that remained in Gaza to draw up “self-help 
projects” for Palestinian refugees that could utilize soon to be available UNWRA funds 
earmarked for new works programs.175  
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The AFSC supported UNWRA’s early objective to give Palestinian refugees, especially 
unemployed farmers and unskilled workers, the opportunity to gain new skills as they worked 
“where they were.”176 UNRWA sought to involve Palestinian refugees in programs of temporary 
small-scale public works that would “help refugees become self-reliant.”177 UN General 
Assembly Resolution 302 (IV)178 tasked UNWRA with the “social rehabilitation of the 
refugees.”179 Passed on 8 December 1949,180 Article 7 dictated that UNWRA’s primary 
objectives were to “carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works 
programs”181 and consult with regional governments “concerning measures to be taken by them 
preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer 
available.”182  
According to UNRWA, its works program offered a key first step for the permanent 
settlement of refugees into host economies and represented an international long-term solution to 
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the so-called refugee problem.183 By reducing the economic burden of hosting refugees and 
simultaneously training refugees with new vocational skills, UN officials believed that exiled 
Palestinians would become more desirable for non-Palestinian host countries. UNWRA 
established infrastructure within refugee camps with the hope of eliminating the need for 
humanitarian intervention.184  
In the Gaza Strip, population density coupled with the limited land availability 
complicated UNWRA’s goal of creating permanent settlements where refugees were already 
residing. In early 1950, UNWRA and the Egyptian government planned to relocate 62,000 
Palestinians refugees from Gaza into a new permanent camp in the Sinai Desert. Palestinian 
refugees, however, resisted the resettlement plan. They were unwilling to compromise 
compensation of lost land or even jeopardize future opportunities to return to their homes.185 In 
response to the proposed relocation project in Sinai, a Palestinian refugee leader explained: “The 
refugees cannot be settled, they cannot be disposed of, and they will not be settled outside the 
[Gaza] strip and this will force the UN to solve their problems in a way [refugees] accept.”186 The 
failure of the Sinai project showcased how the United Nations’ imagined solution to the 
Palestinian refugee crisis diverged from the popular will of Palestinians, which continued to 
disproportionality support the Palestinians right of return outlined in UN Resolution 194. 
 
Words Matter: Resettlement, Not Repatriation  
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Amidst UNWRA’s founding near the end of 1949, the terms “repatriation” and 
“resettlement” were highly politicized in international conversations surrounding “the refugee 
problem.” International conversations moved away from the previously favored Palestinian right 
of return in favor of the terms “repatriation” and “resettlement.” Resettlement elsewhere, in other 
words, overtook the Palestinian call for return in pursuits seeking to solve the refugee crisis. 
According to the AFSC’s Clarence Pickett, the two terms became so “charged with emotional 
content” that it was “practically impossible for a U.N. deliberating body to make any progress 
towards the solution of the [refugee] problem by continuing to use [those] particular words.” 
Instead, it was problematically suggested that “reintegration” or “rehabilitation” were better 
suited and Pickett candidly acknowledged that “everyone recognize[d]” these newly acceptable 
terms were just a disingenuous way of discussing “repatriation and resettlement.”187  
The United Nations began to stray away from seeking to repatriate Palestinian refugees to 
their homes, viewing it as increasingly unfeasible. As Israel phased out international 
humanitarian relief to internal refugees, its War of Return further impeded the right of return for 
Palestinians. Moreover, Israeli delegates at the United Nations utilized their new General 
Assembly seat to block issues pertaining to the Palestinian right of return. These tactics made the 
presence of Palestinian Arabs within Israel misleadingly appear to decrease.188 Consequently, the 
United Nations fell under the misguided illusion that Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews could not 
co-exist. As such the United Nations sought solutions beyond right of return to solve the refugee 
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crisis. Instead “rehabilitation” and “resettlements” were pursued, bolstered by mounting evidence 
that Israel would not yield any territory gained during the war.189 
In the wake of a local survey mission, the United Nations affirmed their belief that 
“Arabs [could not] live comfortably or securely within Israel territory,” even if they were given 
the option to return. While Israel expressed “good faith” during UN-led negotiations to accept 
the return of Palestinians to their homes, there was “great doubt whether local authorities and 
local gangs would co-operate adequately.” Only “Arabs who [were] willing to accept 
discrimination and a new culture” would be able to live within Israel. As a result, “it was clear 
that the partition scheme accepted by the UN Assembly [was] outdated” and any future partition 
schemes “should be on the basis of separate areas for the Arabs and the Jews.”190 The United 
Nations’ objective to separate the two groups shelved the Palestinian right of return during 
negotiations. 
 From the United Nations’ perspective, the threat of local Zionist groups and other forms 
of settler colonial violence made compensation for lost property the “most important factor” in 
facilitating a permanent relocation of Palestinian refugees to places other than their homes and 
ending the so-called refugee problem.191 U.S. Quakers in Gaza witnessed Israel’s settler colonial 
ambition to control Palestinian lands without its Indigenous peoples firsthand. Elwood Geiger, a 
member of the Gaza Unit, doubted the feasibility of Palestinian refugees returning to their homes 
after the Nakba. En route from Tel Aviv to Gaza, Geiger saw “probably hundreds of dozers” 
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leveling Palestinian Arab villages. That drive represented the moment when he “woke up.” 
“[F]or the first time it was clear” to him that Palestinian refugees would not be returning home.192 
While AFSC leadership in the United Stated became increasingly involved in the 
international politics of the Palestinian refugee crisis beyond Gaza, former Gaza Unit members 
joined UNWRA, contributed to a paternalistic legacy of Western aid in Gaza, and reinforced the 
myth of American exceptionalism. Like many U.S. humanitarians at this time, former Gaza Unit 
members imagined that humanitarianism with Palestinian refugees in Gaza functioned as an 
ethical and moral vessel to place the United States’ presence in foreign lands in a more 
acceptable manner. As David Watenpaugh explains, “humanitarianism allowed for an expression 
of an American colonial paternalism without the brutality of reign rule.”193 The AFSC portrayed 
itself as above these kinds of pitfalls, as it was an apolitical group that strictly sought to aid their 
fellow humans. Imperial legacies, however, influenced U.S. Quakers.  
 
AFSC and UNWRA: An Uneasy Alliance  
The AFSC cautiously encouraged “certain members” of its Gaza staff to join UNWRA, 
instead of returning to the United States.194 The Quakers “ethical obligation” to Palestinian 
refugees notwithstanding, the recommendation was made partly because AFSC leadership in 
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Gaza prejudicially felt that Palestinians were unable to “maintain order” without the routine and 
“orderly distribution” of food that the AFSC provided.195 Heeding the advice to stay, 
approximately twenty-five—around of half of the Gaza Unit—agreed to join UNRWA on an 
interim basis. U.S. Quakers shared with their new UNWRA leadership that the plight of the 
Palestinian refugees in Gaza concerned them most.196 Observing their “ethical obligation” to 
uphold the dignity of the people they served, U.S. Quakers feared the ways in which 
humanitarian action in Gaza prolonged the Nakba and at times contradicted Quaker ethics. In 
their efforts to resolve the perceived harm of providing humanitarian aid with no end in sight, the 
remaining Gaza Unit members turned their efforts towards resettlement, believing it to be the 
best option to help and uphold the dignity of Palestinian refugees.197 
Accordingly, the AFSC humanitarians who stayed shifted their foci away from 
emergency aid towards the “training and rehabilitation” of Palestinians. In the eyes of U.S. 
Quakers in Gaza, they “wish[ed] to see ‘these people’ receive help through school programs, 
vocational training to give refugees more opportunities in the future.”198 Thus, when UNWRA 
took up its humanitarian work, U.S. Quakers that hoped for swift repatriation under UN auspices 
shifted away from their former relational approach towards “rehabilitation” initiatives. The 
AFSC’s desire to stay involved in “social welfare activities” in Gaza, particularly in schools, 
evidenced a perpetuation of humanitarian action cloaked in paternalistic imperial ways.  
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The U.S. Quaker organization wanted to ensure school adhered to their views on subjects 
such as gender, commanding that school “was not only for boys, but girls as well.” They alleged 
that previous schooling was mere indoctrination. Instead, they wanted schools in Gaza to focus 
on education, “not just propaganda.” They maintained that school should be free and open to all 
social classes. The AFSC noted a need for "outside personnel" to direct the school programs to 
"withstand the local pressure" to revert to previous practices.199 In all three instances, the AFSC’s 
expectations for schools centred around Eurocentric paradigms. The idea that “local pressure” or 
local involvement in directing school policies would corrupt the quality of education played into 
fears that anything less than a Eurocentric education would result in the failure to properly 
“rehabilitate” students and negatively impact their future chances of resettlement. 
The “self-help” projects proposed by the AFSC in Gaza were training efforts meant to 
“professionalize” supposedly “unskilled” Palestinian refugees. The objective, in step with 
UNRWA’s mission, was to make Palestinians more desirable candidates for reintegration into 
Israel or resettlement in other countries. According to AFSC director Clarence Pickett, Israel was 
a “modern state.” As such, Palestinian refugees needed to embrace modernization à la 
américaine. They should be willing to make the “adjustments necessary” to reintegrate into a 
“new advanced way of life.” Moreover, Pickett believed that “Arabs needed to realize that even 
if they go home as all of them long to do their lives can never be the same as they were before 
the circumstances.” Most Palestinian refugees were farmers; “most of them farmed their little 
plots of land as they were farmed in the days of Jesus.”200  
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In the eyes of the AFSC, training appeared to be a key to emigrating Palestinians into 
neighbouring Arab countries that rejected refugees as “unskilled” labourers.201 For example, it 
was noted that Egypt gradually moved Palestinian refugees who could not support themselves 
outside of Egypt’s formal borders and into the Gaza area. 202 Under Pickett’s leadership, the 
AFSC used its position within UNWRA to prescribe what “was best” for refugees, instead of 
their former approach that focused on listening and working alongside Palestinians to reach 
solutions. 
As a result of this new direction, a fissure started to form between the AFSC and their 
former employees who remained in Gaza. The disbanded Gaza Unit wrote a field manual for the 
United Nations. The AFSC unit’s field manual evidenced its trust that UNWRA would maintain 
personal connections and keep Palestinian refugee desires at the core of its humanitarian work. 
The Gaza Unit outlined some practical advice, such as organizing the blankets by quality before 
distribution and allowing “no exchanges,” checking inventory daily to determine percentage of 
loss, as well as keeping mukhtars out of the distribution centres for the sake of efficiency. Flakes 
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of U.S. exceptionalism were also sprinkled within the pages amongst comments about how it 
was desirable for all employees down to the labourers to know English. The field manual 
asserted a need to cultivate the virtue of honesty amongst Palestinian workers and establish clear 
office hours for handling complaints, or risk spending “full time [hours] as a ‘counsellor’ or 
‘father confessor.’” Racial prejudices notwithstanding, it was also apparent that U.S. Quakers 
strongly believed that a relational approach was crucial to working within Gaza. For example, 
the AFSC cautioned that success in managing ration cards would depend strictly on UNWRA’s 
reputation with Palestinian refugees. As such, it was imperative to “spend some time trying to 
understand [Palestinian refugees]” and their culture.203 This last piece of advice was primarily 
ignored under the new UNRWA leadership. 
It was not long after AFSC’s withdraw from Gaza that the lingering U.S. Quakers started 
to question the trust they placed in UNWRA. In an oral history interview, AFSC Refugee Camp 
Director Alwin Holtz recounted the consternation he felt in a conversation with the UN diplomat 
that took over his job during the spring of 1950. After offering to take the new camp director out 
the next day to introduce him to all the local people, he was met with a shocking response: “Hold 
it, Al. None of that. I came down here with a case of scotch and was told to get along with the 
Egyptians.”204 Instead, the “political appointee… surrounded himself with a bunch of jugheads.” 
His replacement’s “concern for the refugees [was] at a minimum.” According to Holtz, “most 
concern seem[ed] to be for the type of car you drive and to hold onto your job.” UNWRA, in his 
opinion, was becoming a rent-seeking agency that overlooked the Palestinian refugees it served. 
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204 AFSC, Oral History Interview #604, Narrator Alwin Holts, Interviewer: Joan Lowe, 19 September 
1992, AAFSC, 87.   
75 
 
UNWRA’s “whole [humanitarian] program lack[ed] guts, integrity and administrative good 
sense.”205 
The criticism of UNWRA and the United Nations more broadly was perceivably sharper 
coming from Palestinian refugees. A Palestinian refugee (whose name was not recorded) 
reported that: “after UNWRA started to distribute rations, the Palestinian started to take. He 
started begging – and morals were destroyed.”206 This Palestinian refugee believed the 
dependence on aid that the international organization fostered was the main factor in a perceived 
decline in Palestinian morals. Palestinian allegations emerged, at this time, that UNWRA 
actively worked to placate refugees into accepting displacement instead of return. Palestinian 
refugee Salim Rashid, who was noted in the previous chapter for suggesting “it was better if 
there was no agency [wikala],” indicated that UNWRA relief was part of a Western imperial plot 
to make Palestinians accept the loss of their homeland.207 The general distrust for the United 
Nations created an instantaneous distrust of UNWRA amongst many Palestinians. AFSC 
member Colin Bell explained that he was “sure UNWRA would welcome and support in all sorts 
of useful ways any pilot resettlement project undertaken under other auspices [such as the 
AFSC]” because “the fact [was] that [UNWRA is] bogged down [by] the general hatred and 
mistrust of anything which bears the UN label.”208  
Moreover, in a rare move to consider the often-elusive perspective of Palestinian refugees 
within Western documents, Bell logged the "impressions of the Refugees" in a survey report 
 
205 Letter from Alwin Holtz to Corrinne, November 1950; file (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), 
Foreign Service 1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
206 Interview, Gaza City, 14 February 1999, in Feldman, Governing Gaza, 129. 
207 Interview with Salim Rashid, Gaza City, 11 March 1999, in Feldman, Governing Gaza, 129. 
208 Report on Conference on the Middle East Refugee Problem, held at Beirut, Lebanon, 1-8 May 1951, 
written by AFSC member Colin Bell; file (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), Foreign Service 
1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
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seeking a solution to the "refugee problem." According to Bell, Palestinian refugees were 
suspicious that UN relief agencies were “corrupt, inefficient, and quite happy to keep them just 
existing.” UNWRA was “regarded as the UN sop,” or bottom of the barrel by Palestinian 
refugees. It was believed UNWRA halted the “really positive action which the UN ought to be 
taking in the area” that could lead to Palestinian resettlement. Palestinians viewed the United 
Nation's failure to uphold various key resolutions and its proposed partition plans as criminal 
acts. Interestingly, when Palestinian refugees shared their opinions with Bell, he noted that “the 
Jews were mentioned far less than the United Nations.”209 
 Visits to myriad Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Gaza Strip shaped Bell's 
perspective. These types of visits from various diplomatic groups were anything but a novelty to 
Palestinians within these camps. Bell noted how conversations with mukhtars reached “rather 
alarming intensity of passion” as they did not want any more “visiting groups.”210 The Palestinian 
refugees were exhausted by the revolving door of foreign groups who visited and conducted 
surveys. All the while, no change in their circumstance seemed to ever result from those visits. 
Palestinian refugees grew weary of visits where they shared their difficulties and “humiliating”211 
living conditions with Western outsiders. 
Bell observed amongst Palestinian refugees a shift towards accepting resettlement outside 
of Israel, if it would bring them out their abeyance. According to Bell, Palestinian refugees who 
 
209 Report on Conference on the Middle East Refugee Problem, held at Beirut, Lebanon, 1-8 May 1951, 
written by AFSC member Colin Bell; file (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), Foreign Service 
1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
210 Report on Conference on the Middle East Refugee Problem, held at Beirut, Lebanon, 1-8 May 1951, 
written by AFSC member Colin Bell; file (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), Foreign Service 
1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
211 A Palestinian refugee told a journalist in 1949: “The Palestine affair is no longer a matter of liberating 
a country. It has degenerated into a humiliating problem – that of feeding and sheltering refugees,” 




spoke “brazenly about returning to their home” in front of crowds and “utterly eschewed the idea 
of anything but repatriation” tended to speak much more moderately and in somewhat different 
terms when they spoke to Bell privately. The AFSC member believed that a significant number 
of individuals and village groups were “very ready” to resettle, but “it would be very dangerous 
for them express such willingness.” Influential leaders in Palestinian refugee camps were 
typically land or property owners who wanted to return to regain their lost capital in Israel. 
Consequently, there was a perceived risk to speak out in favour of resettlement outside of Israel. 
It was also noted that urban dwellers had much less incentive than rural landowners to return to 
Israel. As such, it was argued that there was a higher willingness to resettle within Palestinian 
refugee communities. Yet it was often missed due to the public nature of the conversations that 
took place on the matter.212 
This waning view of the United Nations cultivated the fading trust of the former Gaza 
Unit workers who resigned amidst UNWRA’s failure to prioritize listening and learning in 
reciprocal ways, as previously favoured under the Service Committee.213 When the United 
Nations shifted focus and resources towards other matters, such as the Korean War, Palestinian 
refugees felt overlooked by the international body. They openly wondered why they were forced 
to watch the United Nations “spring to battle in Korea for the sake of arbitrary frontier, when 
nothing was done to establish the partition lines in Palestine which were decided upon by the UN 
itself?” Palestinian refugees detected that the United Nations should not shirk its responsibility to 
 
212 Report on Conference on the Middle East Refugee Problem, held at Beirut, Lebanon, 1-8 May 1951, 
Colin Bell, AAFSC. 
213 Holtz, former Gaza Unit member, resigned from UNWRA effective 1 October 1950 over conflict with 
UNWRA chief Keen. Holtz also mentioned that Vern Pings recently transferred out of the area into 
Lebanon following “a phony case of “homosex” [sic] on him” in which UNWRA was going to fire him 
without proof or a hearing. Read: Letter from Alwin Holtz to Corrinne, November 1950; file (Country – 
Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), Foreign Service 1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
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amend Palestinians since the international body played an instrumental role in facilitating their 
exile. The United Nations’ move away from Palestinians and towards other refugee situations 
internationally was also noted by Holtz, who left his position with UNRWA in October 1950. 
While Korean refugees needed help, the former AFSC Refugee Camp Director felt that they 
removed the “limelight off our still-needy Palestinians friends.” Humanitarian work with 
Palestinians was incomplete.214 
Palestinian refugees astutely recognized, in conversation with AFSC members, that the 
United Nations’ focus on repatriation changed. As Palestinian refugees grew increasingly 
frustrated by the United Nations’ continued inaction, they appealed to the Cold War zeitgeist and 
took advantage of broader Cold War divisions to garner support in their pursuit to return home. 
During conversations with visiting diplomats, Palestinian refugees invoked the global Cold War 
and made “vailed references to Russia in the form of a challenge that if the western democracies 
refused to recognise the justice of their case, they would turn to others who would be very happy 
to help them.”215 
Like Palestinians refugees, former AFSC Gaza Unit members doubted UN leadership in 
the so-called refugee problem. Holtz opined that the international body’s plan hinged upon the 
success of “cocktail parties” and “lavish entertainment.”216 An agreeing Julia Branson petitioned 
Clarence Pickett about the AFSC’s ethical responsibility to continue to help Gazan refugees. 
Bronson explained that UNWRA’s director had “completely sold out to the Egyptian Army.” 
 
214 Report on Conference on the Middle East Refugee Problem, held at Beirut, Lebanon, 1-8 May 1951, 
written by AFSC member Colin Bell; file (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), Foreign Service 
1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
215 Report on Conference on the Middle East Refugee Problem, held at Beirut, Lebanon, 1-8 May 1951, 
Colin Bell, AAFSC. 
216 Letter from Alwin Holtz to Corrinne, 6 January 1951; file (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), 
Foreign Service 1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
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She received “continuous reports about how very bad the administration” of UNWRA was.217 
Bronson maintained that the AFSC’s previous involvement in Gaza meant they had a “moral 
obligation” to continue working towards “some solution to the problem” by “doing something to 
make it possible for one of the Arab lands to absorb comfortably a group of refugees.” It was 
apparent to her that UNWRA could no longer be trusted. As such, any new U.S. Quaker 
initiatives should exclude UNWRA involvement.  
Internal tensions emerged between former Gaza Unit members and AFSC leadership in 
Philadelphia. Bronson identified hesitation within the U.S. Quaker central executive to work 
towards a solution. This made her “uncomfortable” because she felt that the AFSC was 
“overlooking this section of the world.” While problematically linking the lack of progress in 
resettlement to “Arab governments for being ‘wholly unreliable’,” Bronson thought the AFSC 
was better positioned to negotiate as a private, non-governmental organization—“a private 
organization could come nearer working something out than a governmental one could.”218 In her 
mind, the AFSC did not need the United Nations to help resettle Palestinian refugees. The 
international body was an obstacle to its work, not an ally. As a result of these issues and the 
related loss of confidence from Palestinian refugees, Branson, Holtz and other U.S. Quakers lost 
faith in the UN capabilities and started working on a separate plan to resolve the Palestinian 
refugee crisis without the United Nations. 
 
217 Additionally, Branson accused UNWRA of smearing the AFSC’s reputation writing that “a great many 
derogatory details” were being spread in Gaza about their work and that this would make it “extremely 
difficult” to work with UNWRA going forward. See: Memorandum, Julia Branson to Clarence Pickett, 5 
January 1951; file (Country – Israel: Proposed Gaza Project), Foreign Service 1951, Country-Indonesia 
(STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
218 Memorandum, Julia Branson to Clarence Pickett, 5 January 1951; file (Country – Israel: Proposed 
Gaza Project), Foreign Service 1951, Country-Indonesia (STA – General) series, AAFSC. 
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 The AFSC was not devoid of UN criticism. UN officials commonly accused the 
“Friends” of being “undiplomatic,” lacking the proper procedures to guide their work, being 
closed minded to outside criticism, and being an “intimate group living in their own world.”219 
The U.S. Quaker practice of working alongside Palestinian refugees, instead of in charge of 
them, was scoffed at by a UN Finance Officer charged to review AFSC’s Gaza operation. The 
UN finance officer conceded that while the U.S. Quakers were “most popular” amongst refugees, 
their tendency to rely upon the “nucleus of Palestinian employees” made it “difficult to discern 
who was actually in charge, the international UN members or the privileged group of refugee 
employees.” Paternalistically, they alleged that the AFSC tendency to work alongside 
Palestinians disrupted the preferred power structure that denied refugees from being in a 
“privileged position.”220 The former AFSC Gaza Unit’s divergent approach likely played a key 
role in UNWRA denying its members leadership positions within their organization. From the 
perspective of the international agency, U.S. Quakers were a liability that often-overlooked 
essential bureaucratic procedures. 
 The AFSC’s tendency to overlook vital administrative duties was not unfounded. In fact, 
it was perhaps best exemplified by and within a plan to resettle refugees from Gaza to Syria. 
Proposed by Holtz to UNWRA director James Keen, the U.S. Quaker plan proposed that the 
 
219 According to Quaker Elden Mills, the “very nature of this sort of humanitarian services tends to attract 
folk who are equipped with a liberal supply of individualism, conviction and vigor, and when combined 
under tension, in close quarters, with successive problems constantly arising… life trends to become 
thick.” It seems the Quakers understood that their “conviction and vigor” may have come across harsh to 
outsiders and this criticism may not have been entirely unexpected. Read: Report, Elden Mills to Emmett 
Gulley, 20 June 1949; file #126, Foreign Service 1949, Country-Palestine series, AAFSC. 
220 Review and Assessment of AFSC Operation, 14 October 1950; file #247, Foreign Service 1950, 
Country-Palestine series, AAFSC. According to UNWRA director, James Keen, the report was by a 
Norwegian who was the UN’s current “Financial and Administrative Officer in Gaza.” See: Report on 
UNWRA, James Keen to Clarence Pickett, 15 November 1950; file #247, Foreign Service 1950, Country-
Palestine series, AAFSC. 
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AFSC move “village by village” in Gaza, then transport Palestinian refugees by sea via the 
newly established Syrian port of Latakia into a “land with nothing on it but a few [bedouin].” 
Upon arrival in Syria, U.S. Quakers would help set up wells and schools. While Holtz contended 
that he shared this plan with Keen on multiple occasions, the plan never left port. The lack of 
administrative planning and general preposterousness of the proposal was showcased in Keen’s 
response: “yeah, it’s a good idea, but did you ever try talking to the Syrians about it?”221 
Unsurprisingly, there is no evidence that Holtz or any other U.S. Quaker discussed this plan with 
Syria, let alone Palestinian refugees. 
 Throughout 1951, U.S. Quakers remained known in Gaza as having a "heart for people in 
trouble." A tension between “ethical obligation” and “humanitarian trap” resurfaced. Paul 
Johnson, the original leader of the Gaza Unit, believed that the AFSC was in a unique position to 
assist Palestinian refugees given that the United Nations and other groups were “stuck and 
getting nowhere” when it came to resettlement. Johnson pushed for a fresh AFSC humanitarian 
intervention in Gaza and beyond, as continued UN efforts would lead to an “international failure 
of tragic proportions.” The United Nations, at this time, contemplated inhumane alternatives to 
the status quo. Johnson particularly opposed UN discussions to hinge international aid on 
Palestinians accepting undesired resettlements. Distressed, he noted that the United Nations 
 
221Holtz statement was eerily reminiscent of a popular Zionist phrase, “a land without people for a people 
without land,” in AFSC, Oral History Interview #604, Narrator Alwin Holts, Interviewer: Joan Lowe, 19 
September 1992, AAFSC, 76-78.  
 
For information on how “a land without people for a people without land,” has been misused as a 
justification for colonizing Palestine see: Adam M. Garfinkle, "On the Origin, Meaning, Use and Abuse 
of a Phrase," Middle Eastern Studies 27, 4 (1991): 539-50. 
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planned to achieve this by “WITHDRAWING THEIR RATIONS.” In Johnson’s mind, “this is 
no joke.”222 
Turning over Palestinian relief to Arab governments was another undesirable option from 
Johnson’s perspective because Arab countries did not want the “refugee problem solved on its 
merits,” unless “their price [was] met.”223 Holtz similarly noted: “All of us felt very keenly about 
what the Arab countries were doing politically, using [refugees] as a political football and not 
helping at all. It was their fault to start with. They were the ones that said, ‘You don't have to 
worry. We'll run them into the sea and then you'll come back, and everything will be peachy.’”224  
Notwithstanding ongoing criticism of regional Arab governments and a fracturing 
connection to United Nations, the AFSC did not stop pursuing its ‘moral obligation’ to end 
Palestinian humanitarian plight via resettlement. On that precedent, some members believed that 
if the “Friends are unable to find a way to help bring about a move towards voluntary 
resettlement… no power [whatsoever] can do it under present political circumstances.”225 
Johnson went so far as to plea that the AFSC appeal to the entire Quaker community and send its 
“broadest-gauge and most influential international Quaker delegation” to garner more power. He 
would “happily carry their briefcases” if they were willing to lend their influence to solving the 
Palestinian refugee crisis.226 Despite Johnson's appeal, the AFSC never sent the delegation he 
requested. Similarly, other plans for resettlement failed to come to fruition. A humanitarian trap 
imprisoned Gaza.  
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225 Letter, Paul Johnson to ‘Friends,’ 20 November 1951; AAFSC, 1-4.   





The AFSC time in Gaza provides compelling insights into the history of the hazards of 
modern humanitarianism, especially the potential danger it wielded when "aid recipients" and 
"aid givers" were disconnected from each other. Working alongside Palestinian refugees led U.S. 
Quakers to question the ethics of their work and ultimately withdraw from Gaza in 1951. A clear 
link surfaced between the AFSC evasion of the forming humanitarian trap and the quality of 
their relationships with Palestinian refugees. As connections with Palestinian refugees waned, 
former AFSC members quietly became involved in the United Nations' humanitarian apparatus 
and their "rehabilitation" efforts. Alternatively, others became so outspoken and critical of the 
United Nations that they started to forfeit their influence and, along with it, their opportunities to 
assist Palestinian refugees in resolving their displacement.  
The U.S. Quakers’ novel practice during their aid mandate in Gaza was ahead of its time. 
The AFSC’s work with Palestinian refugees provides a historical example of an aid organization 
withdrawing for moral reasons. While the AFSC created space for Palestinians' perspectives to 
be heard outside of the Gaza Strip, their eventual refusal to participate in aid programs that had 
"no end in sight" distanced the two groups. Persistent bouts of paternalism ended up severing this 
critical connection. Moreover, shifting focus away from direct aid towards political aims such as 
"rehabilitation" or resettlement left the AFSC pushing against the common will of Palestinian 
refugees and their shared desire to return to their homes. 
It is difficult not to wonder what may have transpired if the AFSC could have swayed 
UNWRA to maintain the relational elements of their humanitarian approach in Gaza. If UNWRA 
chose to work alongside Palestinian refugees from its inception, perhaps the organization could 
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have been temporary as first intended leading them to circumvent the grip of the emergent 
humanitarian trap. 
One element of the humanitarian history in Gaza from 1948 through 1951 that remains 
notably persistent was the ingenuity and determination of Palestinian refugees themselves. 
Whether it was finding creative ways to increase the often-meagre rations for their families, 
sharing coffee and tea with the Quakers while sharing stories about their lives and displacement, 
to refusing to resettle in undesirable locations, Palestinian refugees impacted humanitarian actors 






















AFSC Oral History Interview #600: Ten Interviews with People Whose Volunteer Efforts 
 Assisted in Relief Work with Palestinian Refugees in the Gaza Strip – 1948-195,  
series. American Friends Service Committee Archives. Accessed 2 July 2020:  
https://www.afsc.org/content/archive-highlights-palestinian-refugees-gaza. 
 
Archive Highlights: Palestine Refugees in Gaza series. American Friends Service Committee 
 Archives. Accessed on 16 October 2020,  
https://www.afsc.org/content/archive-highlights-palestinian-refugees-gaza. 
 
Clarence Picket Journals 1933-1965 (HC.MC. 1245) series. Quaker & Special Collections, 
 Haverford College, Haverford, PA.  
 
Foreign Service 1948, Country—Palestine (Gaza) series. American Friends Service Committee 
 Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
 
Foreign Service 1949, Country-Palestine, Refugee Project (Clapp Mission) series. American 
 Friends Service Committee Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
Foreign Service 1950, Country-Palestine (Refugee Project) series. American Friends Service 
 Committee Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
Foreign Service 1951, Country – Indonesia to Italy series. American Friends Service Committee 
 Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
 
Foreign Service 1951, Country-Indonesia, STA – General series. American Friends Service 
 Committee Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
Foreign Service 1951, General to International Centers series. American Friends Service 
 Committee Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
United Nations/Foreign Affairs Publications and Resolutions 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1969–1976, Vol. 26, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, 
 Doc. 91, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 31 May 1974. Accessed 7 September 2021: 
 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d91. 
 
United Nations General Assembly, Assistance to Palestine Refugees. 19 November 1948. 




United Nations Convention on the Presentation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
 9 December 1948, Paris France.  
 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Notes on the Secretary-General’s Draft 
 Report on the Works of U.N.R.P.R. 27 October 1949, A/AC.25/W/28. 
 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Records of a Meeting between 
 the Conciliation Commission and Representatives of Relief Organizations in Geneva. 7 
 June 1949. SR/LM/17.  
 
United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations Palestine Relief Head 
 Commends Agencies’ Work in the Near East. Lake Success, New York, Press Release 
 PAL/492, 16 April 1949.  
 
United Nations Progress Report of the United Nations Acting Mediator for Palestine Submitted 
 to the Secretary-General for Transmission to the Members of the United Nations, 18 
 October 1948. A/689 (III). 
 
United Nations Security Council, United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine to the Acting 
 Secretary-General Transmitting the Text of an Armistice Agreement Between Israel and 
 Syria, 20 July 1949, S/1353.  
 
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Final Report of the United Nations Economic 
 Survey Mission for the Middle East. 28 December 1949, A/ AC.25/6. 15–16. 
 
United Nations Resolution 194 (III) 11 December, 1949. A/RES/194 (III). 
 
United Nations Resolution 303 (IV), Palestine: Question of an International Regime for the 
 Jerusalem Area and the Protection of the Holy Places. 275th Plenary Meeting. 9 
 December 1949.  
 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Paris France.   
 
 
Newspapers and Bulletins 
 
“$1,000,000 Waste in Bared in U.N. Middle East Relief.” New York Times. 16 June 1949. Page? 
 
“Israel Balks at U.N. Order for No Man’s Land in Negeb [Negev].” New York Times. 15 
November 1948, pp. 1 and 5. 
 
“Meeting Human Needs in the Near East,” New York Herald Tribune, Thursday, DAY??? 
February 1949. Page? 
 
“Plight of Palestine Refugees: United Nations Aid Plan in Operation.” Reprint from the United   




“U.N. Refugee Body Shifts Buying Plan.” New York Times. 18 June 1949, p. 5. 
 





Gulley, Emmett, Tall Tales by a Tall Quaker. Self-published by Emmett Gulley, Private printing 
(Oregon: Brookings, 1973). 
 
Lehrman, Hal. “Gathering Storm in U.S.-Israeli Relations: The Issues Behind the Conflict.” 
  Commentary (1949): 317-328.  
 
Lie, Trygve. In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: The 
 Macmillan Company, 1954). 
 
Pickett, Clarence. For More Than Bread: An Autobiographical Account of Twenty-Two  





Abu Sitta, Salman and Terry Rempel. “The ICRC and the Detention of Palestinian Civilians in  
Israel's 1948 POW/Labor Camps,” Journal of Palestine Studies 43, 4 (2014): 11-38. 
 
Aiken, Guy. “Feeding Germany: American Quakers in the Weimar Republic,” Diplomatic  
History 43, 4 (2019): 597-617. 
 
American Friends Service Committee. Quaker Work Among Arab Refugees Undertaken  
for the United Nations (Philadelphia: AFSC, 1950). 
 
_____. Steps to Peace: A Quaker View of U.S. Foreign Policy (Philadelphia: AFSC, 1951).  
 
_____. Towards Security through Disarmament (Philadelphia: AFSC, 1952). 
 
_____. Search for Peace in the Middle East: A Report Prepared for the American Friends  
Service Committee (New York: Hill and Wang, 1971). 
 
_____. A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East (New York: Hill and Wang,  
1982). 
 
 _____. “Nobel Peace Prize,” Accessed on 16 October 2019, https://www.afsc.org/nobel-peace-
 prize. 
 
Ateek, Naim Stifan, Cedar Duaybis, and Maurine Tobin. Challenging Christian Zionism:  
88 
 
Theology, Politics, and the Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Melisende, 2005). 
 
Barnett, Michael N. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: 
 Cornell University Press, 2013). 
 
Barnett, Michael and Thomas Weiss. “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present,” in 
Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, 
Power, Ethics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1-48. 
 
Barton, James L. The Story of Near East Relief: An Interpretation (New York: MacMillan,  
1930). 
 
Brayshaw, Neave. The Quakers: Their Story and Message (York, England: William Sessions,  
1969). 
 
Brinks, Phyllis H. “AFSC: Background, Administration, Social Work Contributions,” Thesis 
 Project for Master’s in Social Work at The University of British Columbia, School of 
 Social Work: 1954. 
 
Brinton, Howard. Friends for Three Hundred Years (Wallingford, PA.: Pendle Hill Publications,  
1965). 
 
Byrd, Robert O. Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960). 
 
Cheal, Beryl. “Refugees in the Gaza Strip, December 1948-May 1950,” Journal of Palestine 
   Studies, 18, 1 (1988): 138-157. 
 
Cohen, G. Daniel. “Elusive Neutrality: Christian Humanitarianism and the Question of Palestine,  
1948-1967,” Humanity 5, 2 (2014): 183-210.  
 
El-Abed, Oroub. Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948 (Washington, DC:  
Institute for Palestinian Studies, 2009). 
 
Farah, Randa. “The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees,” in Nicklaus Steineret al., eds.  
Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees and Human Rights (London: Routledge, 
2003), 155–74.  
 
_____. “UNRWA: Through the Eyes of Its Refugee Employees in Jordan,” Refugee  
Survey Quarterly 28, 2-3 (2009): 389-411. 
 
Fassin, Didier. Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. Translated by  
Rachel Gomme (Berkley: University of California Press, 2012). 
 
Feldman, Ilana. “Difficult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, and Political  




_____. “Gaza's Humanitarianism Problem, “Journal of Palestine Studies 38, 3 (2009): 22-37. 
 
______. Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham:  
Duke University Press, 2008). 
 
______. Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics  
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2018). 
 
______."Looking for Humanitarian Purpose: Endurance and the Value of Lives in a Palestinian  
Refugee Camp," Public Culture 27, 3 (2015): 427-447. 
 
_____. “The Quaker Way: Ethical Labor and Humanitarian Relief,” American Ethnologist  
34, 4 (2007): 689-705. 
 
Fischbach, Michael. Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the 
 Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
 
______. The Peace Process and Palestinian Refugee Claims: Addressing Claims for 
 Property Compensation and Restitution (Washington, DC: United States Institute of  
Peace Press, 2007).  
 
Gabbay, Rony E. A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem  
 (Paris: Libraire Mineard, 1959). 
 
Gallagher, Nancy Elizabeth. Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Dilemmas of  
NGO Humanitarian Activism (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2007). 
 
Garfinkle, Adam M. "On the Origin, Meaning, Use and Abuse of a Phrase." Middle Eastern 
 Studies 27, 4 (1991): 539-50. 
 
Greenberg, Ela. Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow: Education and Islam in Mandate Palestine  
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009). 
 
Gunnar, Jahn. “Chairman of the Nobel Committee and Director of the Bank at the Presentation  




Harrell-Bond, Barbara. “Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees Be Humane?” Human Rights  
Quarterly 24, No. 1 (2002): 51–85. 
 
Harvey, Paul and Jeremy Lind, Dependency and Humanitarian Relief: A Critical Analysis. HPG 
  Report 19 (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, July 2005). 
 
Heusel, Lorton. Friends on the Front Line: The Story of Delbert and Ruth Replogle, 




Hoffman, Peter and Thomas Weiss. “Humanitarian and Practitioners: Social Science Matters,” in 
Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, 
Power, Ethics. Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press, 2008: 264-285. 
 
Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007). 
 
Husseini, Jalal Al. “UNRWA and the Refugees: A Difficult but Lasting Marriage,” Journal of 
            Palestine Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2010): 6-26. 
 
Ingles, Larry. “‘Truly Radical, Non-Violent, Friendly Approaches’: Challenges to the American  
Friends Service Committee,” Quaker History 105, 1 (2016): 1-21. 
 
Junod, Dominique-Debora. The Imperiled Red Cross and the Palestine-Eretz-Yisrael  
Conflict 1945-1952: The Influence of Institutional Concerns on a Humanitarian  
Operation (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996). 
 
Kennedy, David. The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
 
Labelle, Maurice Jr. M. "“The American People Know So Little”: The Palestine Arab Refugee  
Office and the Challenges of Anti-Orientalism in the United States, 1955–1962." Mashriq 
& Mahjar Journal of Middle East and North African Migration Studies 5, No. 2 (2018): 
1-27. 
 
Malkki, Liisa. “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization,”  
Cultural Anthropology 11, 2 (1996): 377-404.  
 
Masalha, Nur. “‘Dis/Solving’ the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Israel ‘Resettlement’ Plans in the  
First Decade of the State (1948-1958)” in Ilan Pappé and Jamil Hilal eds. Across the 
Wall: Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History, (New York: NY, Palgrave Macmillian, 
2010), 107-154. 
 
Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
 
____. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 2003). 
 
______. “The Historiography of Deir Yassin.” Journal of Israeli History 24, No. 1 (2005): 
 79-101. 
 
Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
Press, 2010). 
 




Richey, Lisa. “Conceptualizing ‘Everyday Humanitarianism’: Ethics, Affects, and 
Practices of Contemporary Global Helping,” New Political Science 40, 1 (2018): 625-
639.  
 
Redfield, Peter and Erica Bornstein. “An Introduction to the Anthropology of Humanitarianism”  
in Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield, eds. Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism 
between Ethics and Politics (Santa Fe, New Mexico: School for Advanced Research 
Press, 2010), 3-30. 
 
Rieff, David. “The Humanitarian Trap,” World Policy Journal 12, 5 (1995): 1-11. 
 
Riley, Barry. The Political History of American Food Aid: An Uneasy Benevolence, (New York: 
 Oxford University Press, 2017).  
 
Robinson, Shira. Citizen Stranger: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel’s Liberal Settler State, 
 (Stanford University Press: Sandford California, 2013). 
 
Romirowsky, Asaf, and Alexander H. Joffe. Religion, Politics, and the Origins of Palestine  
Refugee Relief (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 
Rosenfeld, Maya. “From Emergency Relief Assistance to Human Development and Back:  
UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2009,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28, 2-3  
(2009): 286-317. 
 
Rufins, Jean-Christopher. Le Piège Humanitaire: Quand L’Humanitaire Replace la Guerre,  
(Lattès: Paris, 1986). 
 
Rubenstein, Jennifer. “The Distributive Commitments of International NGOs,” in Michael  
Barnett and Thomas Weiss, eds. Humanitarian in Question (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2008), 215-234.  
 
Schiffer, Varda, “The 1949 Israeli Offer to Repatriate 100,000 Palestine Refugees,” Middle East 
 Focus 9/2 (1986), 14-20. 
 
Shlaim, Avi. The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921-1951, 
 (Oxford: Oxford University, 2004). 
 
Tamari, Salim, and Elia Zureik, eds. Reinterpreting the Historical Record: The Use of  
Palestinian Refugee Archives for Social Science Research and Policy Analysis 
(Jerusalem: Institution of Jerusalem Studies, 2001). 
 
Vaux, Tony. The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2001: 




Wishah, Um Jabr. "Palestinian Voices: The 1948 War and Its Aftermath." Journal of Palestine 
 Studies 35, no. 4 (2006): 54-62. 
 
Watenpaugh, Keith David. Being Modern in the Middle East: Resolution, Nationalism,  
Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 
_____. Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism  
(Oakland, Ca: University of California Press, 2016). 
 
Weiss, Thomas G, Cindy Collins, and Lawrence Freedman. Humanitarian Challenges and  
Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1996). 
 
Weiss, Thomas G, and Peter J. Hoffman, “Humanitarian and Practitioners: Social Science  
Matters,” in Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Humanitarianism in Question 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 264-285. 
 
Wolfe, Patrick. Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race (London: Verso, 2016). 
 
The World Bank, “Life Expectancy at Birth – Total Years,” Accessed 1 March 2020,  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN. 
 
Wriggins, William Howard. Picking up the Pieces from Portugal to Palestine: Quaker Refugee  
Relief in World War II: A Memoir (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2001). 
 
Yarrow, C. H. Mike. Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation (London: Yale  
University Press, 1978). 
 
